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RELATIONSHIP IN MARK Z. DANIELEW SKI’S HOUSE OF LEAVES

Tracy Stephens, M.A.
Grand Valley State University, 2010
At the center o f Mark Z. Danielewski’s House o f Leaves is the narrative o f The
Navidson Record, the story of Will Navidson’s struggle to understand and conquer the
mystery o f his labyrinthine house - a mystery that is profoundly conneeted to Navidson’s
guilt over Delial, a dead Sudanese girl whose photo made Navidson famous. Navidson’s
preoeeupation with Delial shapes the house, lending it the eharaeteristies o f globalized
spaee as it would have been experieneed by Delial and others in her soeioeeonomie
eireumstanees (whom Zygmunt Bauman has named vagabonds), in eontrast to the
experienee of tourists sueh as Navidson. The vagabonds’ experienee of globalization,
speeifieally with regard to spaee and their ability to oceupy it comfortably, aids us in
understanding the behavior of the house, and the exploitative relationship between
tourists and vagabonds further explains both Navidson’s obsession with the house and the
lesson he learns inside that allows him to eseape.
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Stephens 1
Spatial Rape; Globalization and the Tourist-Vagabond Relationship in Mark Z. Danielewski’s
House o f Leaves
Mark Z. Danielewski’s novel House o f Leaves is a multi-layered and genre-bending work
that defies easy explieation. At its heart is the intrusion o f an unexplainable spatial anomaly into
the home and lives of photojoumalist Will Navidson and his family, just as Navidson is
beginning to let go of his old lifestyle of eontinual travel so that he may reeonneet with his
partner Karen and his ehildren, Chad and Daisy. The aberration, whieh his friend insists on
ealling a “goddamned spatial rape” (55), is a hallway that appears while the family is on
vaeation, a dark eorridor that leads into an enormous, ever-ehanging, endlessly barren labyrinth.
Navidson doeuments his attempts to understand and explore his new house, eventually creating a
film. The Navidson Record, that serves as the audience’s window into Navidson’s story; the bulk
o f the novel is not a narrative of the house and the Navidsons, but rather analyzes, explicates, and
critiques the film. Navidson’s story is thus told to us through the filter o f narrator Zampano’s
critical exegesis, a parody o f academic writing complete with footnotes. That perspective is
further mediated by the arrangement o f Zampano’s work by Johnny Truant, whieh he
intermingles with his commentary and personal narrative. Finally, Truant’s work is added to and
corrected by a team of editors. Multiple layers o f narrative, then, stand between the audience and
Navidson, as does Johnny’s admission that the film, the house, and Navidson him self are all
figments of Zampano’s imagination, and that Zampano, being blind, could never have seen the
film even if it were real. In spite o f this mediation and the disruption of the audience’s
suspension of disbelief, the mystery of the house and o f its relationship to Navidson nonetheless
remains at the center o f the novel at every layer of the narrative. The house’s significance and its
effects are profoundly personal to Navidson and yet radiate from him to Zampano, then to
Johnny, and, finally, to the reader.
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The house is an outgrowth of a crisis of identity and sense o f dislocation provoked for
Navidson by Delial, a dying Sudanese girl whose photo won Navidson the Pulitzer Prize;
Delial’s death inspires in Navidson a sense o f being someone other than the person he had
always imagined himself to be, and Johnny warns the readers in his introduction not to continue
lest they suffer a similar fate. The presence o f this warning and the explicit connection of
Navidson’s identity crisis to his guilt over his exploitation of Delial serve to put Delial at the
center o f Navidson’s story, and Navidson’s relationship to her at the center o f the mystery of the
house. The literal extent o f that relationship ends with Delial dying in N avidson’s arms after he
had taken his award-winning photograph, but their encounter provides deeper insight when we
consider how they stand in relationship to one another within a broader context figured by the
house. Given the differences between their material circumstances, the economic roots of the
crisis in Sudan that predicated D elial’s death, and the exploitative nature o f Navidson’s
interaction with her, the context that most elucidates their relationship is that of the disparate
conditions of global power and resource distribution under globalization. The relevance of sueh
real-world soeioeeonomie conditions to the novel is supported by the fact that the house exhibits
various behaviors and characteristics - its labyrinthine structure, its instability, and its complete
and permanent blankness, as well as the feelings o f unhomeliness it inspires - that parallel the
material and psychic effects of globalization as it is experienced by the unfortunate class of
people Zygmunt Bauman refers to in Globalization: The Human Consequences as “vagabonds,”
in eontrast to the more fortunate class, the “tourists.” In reality these two classes do not stand in
stable opposition to one another; one is a tourist or a vagabond at any given moment depending
upon one’s ability to participate freely in the market as a consumer and traveler. Nevertheless,
the terms describe two different lifestyles, two different positions within the structure of the
global economic system, that are represented accurately in the novel by Navidson and Delial; he
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is a tourist, and she is a vagabond, and their relationship matches the new class dynamic that
Bauman articulates.
Readers may interpret the events of The Navidson Record, then, as the house confronting
Navidson with the vagabond’s experience of globalization, so that he may come to terms with the
role he may have played in Delial’s death and in the suffering o f countless others who have been
reduced to vagabondage. The novel carries its audience along on this journey, exposing us to the
house’s uncanniness through its multiple levels o f diegesis, its aporias, its unusual textual layout,
and other techniques that trap the readers in the house alongside Navidson. For this reason, much
of the existing criticism o f the text tends to focus on the symbolic connection o f the house and
the novel, either taking a more formalist and meta-textual approach - such as Mark B. N.
Hansen’s discussion o f the novel’s unusual wedding of form and content through typographical
innovation - or else taking the shape of more philosophical discussions of the various facets of
postmodernism manifested within both the house and the novel, as in the work o f Will Slocombe
(who traces out nihilistic ideas in the text) and N. Katherine Hayles (who compares the novel to
postmodern theory in general as it concerns the role o f the subject). These readings pay too little
attention, however, to the exposure of our true selves o f which Johnny warns us, as well as to the
self-assessment that the novel informs us is the motivation for Navidson’s engagement with the
house’s mystery. Navidson confesses his guilt over DeliaTs death to Karen and to the audience
just before entering the house one final time. His confession implicates the whole “god awful
world” in her death as well as establishing her as the cause o f his crisis o f identity, thus also
implicating the readers and making Delial the cause o f the exposure o f our own true selves, the
selves who are culpable for DeliaTs suffering and demise. But the novel does not leave Navidson
or the readers trapped within the labyrinth forever, and the purpose o f the confrontation is not
punishment, but rather understanding. Navidson returns to the house in order to assess the value
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o f his life and his art and to come to some conclusion about how best to cope with and address
his recognition o f his exploitation of others; upon reaching that conclusion, the house dissolves.
The novel, then, is best explained as an exploration o f the tourist’s responsibility for the
conditions to which globalization consigns its vagabonds, and o f how to accept that
responsibility and move forward.
I. Delial
Given the focus on Navidson and Delial’s relationship as an articulation o f the
tourist/vagabond dynamic, establishing Delial’s centrality to the text is o f highest priority. Her
significance may not be obvious upon first examination because she appears to have so little
presence in the novel until the point when her identity is finally explained - first when it is
revealed that the name Delial is written on the back o f Navidson’s Pulitzer Prize-winning
photograph (368), and then more fully by Navidson in his letter to Karen (391). However, the
mystery surrounding Delial itself indicates her significance to the story. Within the text, “Delial”
is, to use the convenient terminology o f the TVTropes.org Wiki, an “arc word,” which is defined
as “An enigmatic word or phrase that occurs, unexplained and without context, here and there
throughout an arc, and (with luck) is explained at or near the climax” (“Arc Words”). Although
the word Delial is largely absent between page 17 and page 368 (there is one other mention, on
page 102, that leaves the name as yet mysterious), the introduction o f it so long before it is
explained, as is typical o f an arc word, means that the mystery o f its meaning is a preoccupation
as one progresses through the novel. Even without reminders, the question is continually present.
The same cannot be said o f the photograph with which the name, we eventually learn, is
associated. The photograph is first mentioned on page six, in the initial introduction o f Will
Navidson: “eventually a number of photographers in the news community did recognize the
author as none other than Will Navidson, the prize-winning photojoumalist who won the Pulitzer
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for his pieture of a dying girl in Sudan” (6). It is interesting that Navidson is identified by the
photograph, and introdueed to us with the detail o f his having taken it; the pieture’s signifieanee
is indieated by the fact that Navidson’s authorship of it is the first thing that we learn about him,
and in the same sentenee that names him as the author of The Navidson Record. The film and the
photograph are thus conneeted if not laid parallel to eaeh other in Navidson’s introduetion. But
although there are many referenees to Navidson’s skill and his sueeess, whieh reeall the Delial
photograph for those on a seeond (or even later) reading, the photograph itself disappears from
the book even more completely than the name until it is plaeed in front o f us again on page 368.'
There is not even an air of mystery surrounding it to keep it present in our minds. If Delial is an
arc word, the photograph is what TVTropes.org names a “Chekhov’s Gun,” a seemingly
insignifieant or irrelevant detail that will, later on, have an enormous impact on the plot
(“Chekhov’s Gun”). Yet, the way it is first introduced implies, though with more subtlety than
Delial’s introduetion, a future significance that the novel bears out.
The first appearanee o f the name Delial indieates much more directly than the
introduetion o f the photograph just how deeply she is embedded in Navidson’s story. The novel
tells us that Navidson is plagued by “alienating and intensely private obsessions” but that the
first sign o f his “dark broodings” eomes from Karen (117), when she, while eomplaining about
Navidson saying the name in his sleep, introduees us to Delial. Karen, we are told, does not
know to whom the name refers, though she seems eonfident that the word is a name, and a
female one: “I’ve warned him,” she says, “if he’s not going to tell me who she is he better damn
not bring her up” (17). Her eertainty indicates - in part because Delial seems not to exist as a
name at all or to have any meaning outside o f this work - that Navidson has spoken of her in

' At this point the “editors” tell us the real-life story o f photojoumalist Kevin Carter, on w hose work and later suicide
the story o f Delial and her picture are based; see the Appendix for the real-life photograph.
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human terms even if he has not revealed her identity, a fact that is confirmed when the text states
that one of Navidson’s stock responses to questions about Delial is that she was someone “close
to [him]” (394). Navidson’s regard for Delial as a person, not as a symbol, will become
important as this discussion goes forward.
The secrecy surrounding Delial’s identity is discussed twice - once in the beginning, and
once after the reveal. In both o f these discussions, Delial is compared to Coleridge’s albatross:
“No one had any idea who she was or why it was she haunted his thoughts and conversation like
some albatross” (17); “Delial is to Navidson what the albatross is to Coleridge’s mariner. In both
cases, both men shot their mark only to be haunted by the accomplishment” (394). The recurring
use o f this metaphor is relevant in two ways. The first, and more obvious, is the implication that
taking Delial’s photograph has, as in Coleridge’s “ The Rime o f the Ancient Mariner,” somehow
cursed Navidson and that it is specifically she that is haunting him. The second recalls that, as
Serenity's Captain Malcolm Reynolds so succinctly puts it, “Way I remember it, albatross was a
ship’s good luck, ‘til some idiot killed it” (Serenity). In other words, the metaphor also indicates
that some connection between Delial and Navidson existed before he took her picture, some
connection that was beneficial to him. This will prove to be relevant in two ways; the first relates
to the exploitative relationship between tourists and vagabonds that Bauman describes, and the
second to the potential o f subject-subject relationships in spite of that exploitation.
Delial is not merely a presence in the novel, however, but a primary motivating force for
Navidson’s engagement with the house. The chapter (XVII) in which Navidson directly explains
who she is is titled, according to Appendix A, “Reasons” (540). It is an attempt to answer, very
specifically, a question that appears in large and bold font on page 385: “Why Did Navidson Go
Back To the House?” In this chapter we find Navidson’s letter to Karen, which is (appropriately,
as it is his attempt to explain him self to her) the focus of one of the major attempts to understand
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Navidson’s motivations. The letter states that he “can’t get Delial out o f [his] head.” Although he
tells Karen that “that’s all she is..., just the photo,” he continues to say that it is not the photo
(“that photo, that thing”) that is haunting him, but the little girl she was before he took her
picture. Said haunting is causing him not just guilt, or some intellectual uncertainty about
whether he had done the right thing, but outright anguish: “i miss miss miss but i didn’t miss i
got her along with the vulture in the background when the real vulture was the guy with the
camera preying on her for his fuck pulitzer prize.” The expression o f anguish continues: “i wish i
were dead right now i wish i were dead that poor little baby this god god awful world im sorry i
cant stop thinking o f her never have never will” (391-3). Navidson mentions missing Karen and
his children, as well as Wax, Jed, and Holloway, his fellow soldiers in the battle to conquer his
house, and a number o f men with whom he served in another conflict (391), and he says outright
that it might be his brother Tom (who dies in the house) whom he is actually going back to find.
Nonetheless, Delial has a place in his letter of much greater significance than anyone else; two
and a half o f its four pages are nothing but his confession, her story. The letter suggests that his
guilt, his outright self-loathing, at having paused to take her picture while she was dying and then
benefiting so greatly from it is the overwhelming driving force o f his return. Thus, we are told
after the letter that “She is all he needs to find” (394). Even what Navidson writes about looking
for Tom is colored by the juxtaposition of Tom having saved Daisy while Navidson failed to save
Delial: “no tom there, i was no tom there” (393). And most significantly, what Navidson has
experienced post-Delial is the alienation o f himself, a lack o f certainty about his identity and his
value: “i miss the man i thought i was before i met her the man who would have saved her who
would have done something who would have been tom” (393). The exposure o f Navidson’s
perceived self, the man he thought he was, as a fiction is vital both to Navidson’s motives and to
this discussion.
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Although “Reasons” introduces to us three different explanations for Navidson’s return to
the house, only the second two are treated as having validity. The first, “The Kellogg-Antwerk
Claim,” which theorizes that Navidson returns out o f some need to “territorialize and thus
preside over that virtually unfathomable space,” is dismissed (386), though perhaps too quickly.
The second is the “Bister-Frieden-Josephson [or BFJ] Criteria,” which focuses on Navidson’s
emotional state, with the letter as the primary point o f discussion, and as a result pays the most
attention o f the three to Delial. The most interesting part o f the discussion, however, is the way in
which it insists that Delial’s significance has been inflated, and that his dwelling on Delial is in
actuality a method of coping with his grief at losing Tom. The narrator makes a point to mention
that this interpretation has been controversial: “To this day the treatment o f Delial by the BisterFrieden-Josephson Criteria is still considered harsh and particularly insensate toward
international tragedy.” This claim is not “backed up” by quotes from any “outside sources”
critical of the BFJ Criteria, however; instead, the paragraph only goes on to offer evidence for
the validity o f the criticism, by way of a quote illustrating the BFJ Criteria’s belief that Delial
“soon exceeded the meaning o f her own existence” : “Memory, experience, and time turned her
bones into a trope for everything Navidson had ever lost” (395). What this introduction o f an
undocumented controversy suggests is that the criticism comes from the author - to whomever of
the four (Danielewski, the mysterious editors, Johnny, or Zampano) we wish to attribute it.
Following from that, the statement is not an attempt to present both the strengths and weaknesses
o f the Criteria so that we may assess its value for ourselves, as is ostensibly the goal of the kind
o f writing the novel imitates, but rather a deliberate attempt to instill some skepticism if not even
disgust at the BFJ Criteria’s treatment o f Delial.
In fairness to Bister, Frieden, and Josephson, however, the Haven-Slocum Theory (the
third o f the possible “reasons”) is no less dismissive o f Delial:
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The desire to save Delial must partly be attributed to a projection of Navidson’s
own desire to be cradled by his mother. Therefore his grief fuses his sense of self
with his understanding of the other, causing him not only to mourn for the tiny
child but for himself as well. (397)
However, the objective suggested by the theory (and the dreams on which it is based) is much
more compatible with Navidson’s preoccupation w ith Delial than the analysis admits. Both his
dream o f the way station and his dream o f the snail end with Navidson puzzling over a decision
(whether to leap, whether to continue exploring) and not being able to choose. In the first dream,
the decision depends explicitly upon a reckoning with himself and his past to determine whether
he has led a “good” or an “inappropriate” life. The second also depends, though more subtly,
upon an assessment of the value o f his life, in that he must decide either to go on exploring the
snail shell, continuing along the soon-to-be dark and increasingly narrow passageway, or else to
turn back and join the others who have already turned back, returning to the world and his life in
it (399). Haven and Slocum offer this interpretation o f the first dream, which also applies to the
second: “The dream seems to suggest that in order for Navidson to properly escape the house he
must first reach an understanding about his own life” (399). They offer no explanation for the
cause of Navidson’s confusion about his life, however; their focus is on the house and its effects,
and their ultimate explanation for Navidson’s return is rooted in its results (“the house became a
house again” (406)), which is, in a sense, not an explanation o f Navidson’s “reasons” at all.
However, the need for Navidson to reach an understanding about his life is congruent with what
actually happens to him while he is inside, and, more importantly, fits with his sense of having
lost sight o f who he is as a man, having lost the conception he had had o f him self before meeting
Delial as a man who would try to do the right thing and succeed, “the man who would have
saved her” (393). Navidson’s problem is that he is not the person he believed he once was, and
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that is because of Delial.
That last sentence deliberately echoes one from Johnny Truant’s introductory chapter,
wherein Johnny offers the readers his aforementioned warning about what will happen to them
(as happened to him) if they proceed with reading the book, a warning that makes very deliberate
allusions to the house on Ash Tree Lane itself. He warns of “slow and subtle shifts,” of
struggling to keep the “darkness” “at bay,” of the intrusion o f a “great complexity”; more
importantly, he warns; “you’ll discover you no longer trust the very walls you always took for
granted. Even the hallways you’ve walked a hundred times will feel longer, much longer, and the
shadows, any shadow at all, will suddenly seem deeper, much, much deeper” (xxiii). These
allusions are important because they help to establish the parallels between Johnny’s story and
the events of The Navidson Record. The most significant o f those parallels, however, lies in the
sentence on which I have modeled the one above: “For some reason, you will no longer be the
person you believed you once were” (xxii). This is an idea that recurs throughout Johnny’s story,
most often in the form of the phrase “Known some call is air am,” which is the phonetic spelling
o f the Latin sentence “Non sum qualis cram,” meaning, Johnny tells us, “I am not what I used to
be" (72).
One of the consequences of reading the novel, then, is to experience exactly what
Navidson experiences after Delial dies; readers, like Navidson, end up “missing the people they
thought they were before they met her.” Based solely on that one sentence, that conclusion is a
bit tenuous, but more of Johnny’s warnings recall Navidson’s lack o f understanding about his
life. He tells the reader, “you’ll watch yourself dismantle every assurance you ever lived by”; he
says that “a great complexity” will rip apart, “piece by piece, all of your carefully conceived
denials, whether deliberate or unconscious”; much more importantly, he warns the readers of
having to face “the thing you most dread, what is now, what will be, what has always come
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before, the creature you truly are, the creature we all are” (xxiii). The selves we believed
ourselves to be will be exposed as lies, and some new awareness o f forgotten origin will allow us
to see, even as we try to avoid it, the people we really are. This realization is the thrust of
Johnny’s entire warning; at the heart of the experience of reading The Navidson Record is the
exposure of ourselves to ourselves as people very different from the ones we wish we were. The
parallel suggests, further, that said exposure is also at the heart of The Navidson Record itself.
Navidson’s confession about Delial and how it destroyed his sense o f self is thus central to the
work. Furthermore, Johnny says that this creature that we all are is “buried in the nameless black
o f a name” (xxiii). While one obvious interpretation o f Johnny’s statement is that the name in
question is our own, there is also the possibility that it is DeliaTs. The mystery surrounding her
identity arguably offers her name more significance than anyone else’s and recalls the idea of
names and naming most clearly. Moreover, that the name is also “nameless” further recalls that
the name’s meaning remains secret for so much o f the novel. If that premise is allowed, then
what Johnny is telling us fits with the overall argument, that the experience o f being inside the
house, of assembling The Navidson Record, and o f reading the book - the hugely unhappy
recognition of our true selves - is rooted in the witnessing o f DeliaTs circumstances and her
death, thus placing her at the center o f not just The Navidson Recordhvd the entire text.
II. Globalization: Tourists and Vagabonds
O f course, the most compelling evidence o f DeliaTs centrality to the text is that Delial
and her suffering, and what they mean to Navidson and the readers, are manifested in the house
itself, through the house’s replication o f the material and psychic conditions o f globalization for
the vagabond. The terminology to be used herein requires some attention before moving forward,
as globalization is, according to Bauman, a “fad word” whose meaning has become clouded: “the
more experiences [vogue words] pretend to make transparent, the more they themselves become
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opaque” (1). In other words, the term “globalization” has come to be used to describe or explain
so much o f modern experience that it is no longer clear to what processes or conditions or
deliberate projects it actually applies. Within this discussion, then, globalization will be used as
shorthand for both “the globalization project” and “neoliberal globalization.” The former is the
term preferred by Philip McMichael because, he writes, “To call it a project emphasizes the
politics of globalization” and exposes that it is not “natural” (149). The latter defines
globalization specifically as the deliberate global spread - by the influence and intervention of
the governments and corporations o f the richest nations, the Bretton Woods institutions (The
International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank), and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) - o f the neoliberal or free market form of capitalism. It should be noted that this
definition requires using the term somewhat differently from Bauman, who states that the term
“refers primarily to the global effects, notoriously unintended and unanticipated, rather than to
global initiatives and undertakings’" (60). However, Bauman’s approach to globalization is to
treat it almost as a social pathology, focusing on its symptoms, many o f which are not widely
known or understood, while McMichael is providing a history o f the institutionalization o f a
neoliberal global economy through deliberate acts o f policy, the consequences o f which are no
less real and were no less inevitable regardless of their intentionality.
The two positions are thus not truly in conflict with one another: certainly the effects
Bauman notes were not the purpose of the political action McMichael documents, but those
actions are still their cause. McMichael’s term is preferable for the purposes o f this argument
because the political realities underlying globalization will be important to remember, as they
explain why globalization is not, as Bauman suggests we tend to believe, “a process that affects
us in the same measure and in the same way” (1). Rather, globalization is a highly (and
intentionally) stratifying form o f global economic organization, offering prosperity for the few
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and economic and social hardships for the rest. McMichael lists some o f these hardships:
“poverty, displacement, job and food insecurity, health crises (AIDS), and a widening-band of
informal activity as people make do in lieu o f stable jobs, government supports, and sustainable
habitats” (192). The enormous disparity in socioeconomic conditions is, first and foremost,
where the material realities o f globalization begin to resonate within House o f Leaves.
It would be a mistake to assume that the stratification created by globalization emerges
because some are “left behind” while others prosper. As will become important as I begin to
connect these social trends with the behavior of the house, there is, as far as we on the inside of it
are concerned, no “outside” to the globalization project. McMichael writes o f the importance o f
“compliance” within the globalization project, a condition that is assured through the
development of consensus - created by convincing governments and citizens o f the fairness and
efficiency of the free market - and coercion - made possible by the institutionalization, both
internationally and locally, o f laissez faire economic policies (154). According to McMichael, the
central mechanism of the globalization project is liberalization, a broad term for the economic
protocols adopted and imposed by such “global managers” as IMF, World Bank, and WTO
officials, members of G-20 governments, and the CEOs and directors o f transnational
corporations or global banks (157). They are “imposed” in the sense that liberalization - which
opens the nation to foreign investment, limits state powers, and in general emphasizes
participation in global trade over the social objectives o f national development (157-8) - is the
prerequisite for being deemed creditworthy by the rest o f the world. The downgrading of social
goals is a built-in part o f the ideology o f neoliberalism, which involves the cutting o f social
welfare and entitlement programs, the privatization o f necessary public services (including but
not limited to health care, utilities, and even education or emergency response), and the
elimination o f the hindrances on free enterprise represented by financial, environmental, worker
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safety, or consumer protection regulation (160). The dissolution o f whatever social safety net
may have existed in the developing world, as well as the lack o f natural resource management
and environmental protection, results in what is popularly known as the “race to the bottom.”
And this says nothing about the phenomena o f displacement and recolonization or the social
hardships listed previously. But for poor nations, unable either to sustain themselves without
trade or to compete in the global market on their own terms, the procurement o f loans and/or
foreign investment is a short-term necessity, no matter the long-term costs.
Sudan, Delial’s homeland, was no different. During the 1980s, when Navidson must have
taken her picture {The Navidson Record was filmed, the novel tells us, beginning in April o f
1990 (8)), Sudan’s long second civil war was already being waged, having begun in 1983 (PGA
1). While most humanitarian attention to Sudan during that time was focused on the war, the
influx of foreign refugees during the same years, and the famine the war helped to create
(Sudan.net), one does not have to stretch far back into the country’s history to connect its
situation with its place in the global economy. Even without considering the most obvious
historical roots o f the poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, market forces played a role in creating the
political conditions that created the backdrop for the Delial photograph: five years before the
civil war began, in 1978, oil was discovered in the southern part o f the country, and the north and
south began to fight for control over it (Rone 60). A 2000 Amnesty International study titled “Oil
in Sudan Deteriorating Human Rights” indicates that the genocidal tactics o f displacement and
depopulation characterizing the civil war have been practiced in part for the sake o f honoring
contracts with foreign investors - including Chevron (Rone 62) - in the Sudanese oil fields: “as
early as...the 1980s, the local population was permanently displaced from the areas o f the Unity
and Heglig oil fields..., which at the time were operated by the French oil company Total” (PGA
1). Moreover, Sudan and other poor African nations’ GDPs were largely dependent on the

Stephens 15
exportation of a small number of primary commodities - that is, commodities that need little to
no processing before they are ready for use (2). Globalization - which promotes the idea of
“comparative advantage,” the specialization o f economic activity according to the country’s
resource base, as a nation’s greatest opportunity for prosperity (McMichael 159) - encourages
such primary commodity exportation. This practice is dangerous in that it fosters dependence
over self-reliance, encourages the unsustainable use o f resources, and requires the country to part
with commodities that are desperately needed by their own people, such as food or, in Sudan’s
case, fuel oil (PGA 1). Sudan’s resources were then through the 1980s and beyond further
depleted by the war, fought in part for the sake of gaining comparative advantage as a petroleumexporting country, leading to the famine conditions depicted in Navidson’s photograph. Delial’s
death may have predated the WTO and the most aggressive global institutionalization of
neoliberalism, but the conditions in Sudan at the time of Navidson’s visit have everything to do
with the stratifying effects of the unfair conditions o f global trade.
Certainly, Navidson stands in relationship to Delial in a way that illustrates that
stratification. Navidson, in comparison to Delial, is in a position of privilege so great it is absurd.
“Navidson works out every day, devours volumes o f esoteric criticism,” we are told (32). He is
successful in his profession, enough that he is given “the Guggenheim Fellowship and the NBA
Media Arts Grant” to fund his documentary (8). With the grants, savings, equity, and credit,
Navidson is worth about a million dollars (148). He can afford to buy a home, provide for Karen
and his children, and support Tom when he needs it. He has famous friends (63), “is respected by
thousands” in his own right (247), and has a wide social network allowing him to be in touch
with explorers and scientists when demanded by his curiosity about his house. He is a worldtraveler. The Navidson Record praises him for his “courage” in going to Sudan and walking “the
violent, disease-infested streets” and for “contend[ing] with the infinite number of ways he could
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photograph [Delial]” (419-20). The novel does no t credit Delial, who walked those same streets
as long as she still had the strength, with the same courage. She has not the luxury o f such high
regard. Nor does she have the luxury of a supportive social network or connections to people
with influence or needed skills. She certainly lacks the luxury of grants, exercise, art, and
criticism. As she exists to us, she has no name beyond the one Navidson gave her, no family, no
home. Navidson finds her squatting in the dirt, a likely-scavenged bone the only food available
to her, “her lips a crawl of insects, her eyes swollen with sand” (420). And, of course, at the time
of The Navidson Record, she no longer has her life.
At the same time, Navidson is not one of the super-rich, not a member of the capitalist or
ruling class. If the different positions Delial and Navidson occupied were simply those of poverty
and wealth, he would need to be richer; if, alternately, the contrast rested on Navidson’s being
simply a typical privileged American, he would need to be poorer or at least less famous. The
contrast between Navidson and Delial is not, then, as simple as a statement about social class
inequality within the global economy or about the obliviousness of citizens o f industrialized
nations to the reality of absolute poverty and hunger in much of the rest of the world. Not being
rich, not being powerful, and not being oblivious to suffering, the luxury enjoyed by those who
benefit from global economic stratification (and denied to those who are harmed by it) that is
most embodied in Navidson’s lifestyle is, in fact, mobility, which Bauman identifies as the “main
stratifying factor o f our late-modern or postmodern times” (2). For Bauman, mobility, the lack of
it, and the effect of either on space, are central to the experience of globalization, and it is with
regard to mobility that Navidson and Delial are most representative of the disparity in lifestyles
and quality o f life created by globalization. For Bauman, globalization gives birth to a new class
model, in which people, depending on their mobility and how effectively they act as consumers,
may occupy the position o f “tourist” or “vagabond” ; Navidson is solidly one o f the former.
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Delial one of the latter.
Bauman justifies rooting his class divisions on mobility by detailing the effects that
globalization has had on mobility (and therefore space) for both tourists and vagabonds, effects
that we see clearly reflected in the material conditions of Navidson and Delial. Bauman argues
that the primary results o f globalization are “spatial segregation, separation and exclusion” (3),
and these results come primarily from globalization’s effects on space and time, creating what he
calls the “time/space compression” o f globalization (2). “Time/space compression” refers to the
conquering o f distance by technologies that allow the global elites to travel either physically (by
plane, for instance) or virtually (over the Internet) with sufficient speed that they are essentially
free from the constraints o f either time or space. H e explains:
[LJittle in the elite’s life experience now implies a difference between
‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘close by’ and ‘far away’. With
time o f communication imploding and shrinking to the no-size o f the
instant, space and spatial markers cease to matter. (13)
Compression o f space and time is not merely the experience o f the elite, however, but the ideal
on which global capitalism is modeled and a goal which it has very actively pursued in what
Bauman calls “the Great War o f Independence from Space” (8). The liberalization o f capital has
been the key to this independence, since corporations are now free to move elsewhere if
localities attempt to enforce regulations, impose taxes, or otherwise place any responsibility for
the care o f the community into the hands o f the corporation - all actions that are, to use the
dangerous phrasing of Chapter 11, Article 10 o f the NAFTA accord, “tantamount to
expropriation” and therefore in violation o f the rules of global trade (Pavey and Williams). The
justification for this is simple: the corporation’s obligation is to its shareholders, and since the
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shareholders are beholden to no particular locality, because they are geographically dispersed,
the corporation is thus also beholden to no particular locality.
Independence from spatial constraints defines not just the conditions o f trade, however,
but also the real, lived experience o f globalization for the tourist. Tourists, Bauman writes, “stay
or move at their hearts’ desire” because “they find the world within their (global) reach
irresistibly attractive'" (92); in short, tourists move because it is what they want to do, whether
they are compelled by some horror at the idea of standing still - manifested, as will be discussed
later, in the horror o f and rejection o f the vagabond - or by a more optimistic desire to acquire
the new experiences and sensations for sale in the global consumer society (92). And certainly
this freedom to move characterizes Navidson; “[TJaking off at a moment’s notice to shoot
Alaskan fishing boats” or to Sudan to photograph a humanitarian crisis or to India to “capture the
clamor of industry outside Hyderabad” (37) or to Cambodia or Thailand or Israel or Angola
(367) or wherever else his attention was drawn was a normal part o f life for Navidson (17), his
career continually carrying away from home (10). The attractions offered by his mobility are
nearly impossible for him to resist; he acquiesces to Karen’s demands that he give up his globe
trotting lifestyle with reluctance, and ultimately cannot resist the opportunity to explore the
house, to treat it as a new adventure; we are told that he “finds himself constantly itching to leave
his family for that place” (82). More than any desire to simply solve the mystery o f the house, he
wants to walk through it and see and experience whatever is to be found inside. But although he
moves because he wishes to, he also has the luxury o f settling down in one place, to move into a
place “and start to inhabit it. Settle in, maybe put down some roots” (9). He has the chance to
create for himself “an outpost set against the transience o f the world” (23). O f course, the house
in which he has chosen to live hardly serves that purpose for him, but the point remains that,
especially in his life before the house on Ash Tree Lane, Navidson moves, or does not, according
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to his own will. Moreover, in his work and in his settling down for Karen and the kids rather than
for himself, he suffers the hardships of the tourist’s lifestyle, as Bauman describes them: “the
impossibility of slowing down, uncertainty wrapping every choice, risks attached to every
decision” (98). In the house, of course, Navidson faces different hardships, but the possibility
that the house renders Navidson a vagabond does not come into play until very late into The
Navidson Record. Throughout the bulk of the text, that role belongs to Delial.
The conditions o f the vagabond are nowhere near as pleasant as those o f the tourist: “If
the new extraterritoriality o f the elite feels like intoxicating freedom,” writes Bauman, “the
territoriality o f the rest feels less like home ground, and ever more like prison” (23). One should
not take that to mean, however, that the vagabond’s experience is characterized by a lack of
movement, as such immobility is impossible in the globalized world, as Bauman also notes:
“One cannot ‘stay put’ in moving sands. Neither can one stay put in this late-modem or
postmodern world of ours - a world with reference points on wheels” (78). Rather, the vagabond
lacks the ability to move according to his or her own will; vagabonds move when and where they
are made to by forces outside their control. Vagabonds, then, cannot occupy any space
comfortably, cannot settle in anywhere and put down roots, cannot travel in order to consume the
(generally manufactured, in order to ensure their pleasantness) experiences and sensations of
unfamiliar places. They are displaced because they are in the way, they are welcome nowhere,
and they “are allowed neither to stay put...nor search for a better place to be” (92-3). This kind o f
forced migration has been common throughout history, from the Trail of Tears to the slaughter of
the U ’wa in Colombia (Hougland 1) to the previously-mentioned displacement from the southern
Sudan oil fields, but the real absurdity o f the vagabond’s position, o f being forced to move but
having nowhere to go, is probably more effectively illustrated through examples o f the house’s
behavior in the novel under examination here: the house dragging Tom two steps back for every
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for every step he tries to take toward the window during the family’s escape (346), for instance,
or Navidson’s being rolled downhill on his bike regardless of wbich direction he faces during his
final exploration (425). The vagabond’s situation is one of futility o f surreal, tragicomic
proportions, and certainly futility cbaracterizes what we know of Delial’s life, and of Navidson’s
final attempt to help her, picking her up and running with her to nowhere. O f course, knowing as
little as we do about Delial, tbere is not mucb direct evidence that can be used to argue for ber
status as a vagabond before Navidson found ber; however, we can state witb some certainty that
she was in a locality over whose terrible circumstances sbe had no control, and that she had no
chance at a better life somewhere else. She did not have a place to set down roots: for one, Sudan
was experiencing the chaos of civil war; for two, Navidson found her “twelve miles from
nowhere” (393). Even disregarding her extreme youth, she was helpless and without any control
over the space in which she existed.
III. Space, Mapping, and Exteriority
Much o f Bauman’s discussion o f the tourist/vagabond dynamic is centered on tbe idea of
being or feeling “at home,” a concept o f huge importance to which I will return. However, this
feeling is dependent, as noted, upon a sense o f control over space and/or one’s relationship to it,
an idea that becomes more striking in relationship to the behavior o f the house, and which
therefore needs more attention. Contained within this question of control are issues of alterations
to space, of perception of space and its mapping, and o f the meaning, value, or historicity of
space inhabited by people, as they pertain both to vagabonds and to those within the house.
Because of the novel’s aggressive postmodernism, though, and the connection of the house’s
structure to the trope of the labyrinth in other preceding postmodern works, as explored by
Natalie Hamilton, tbe discussion o f the behavior o f the house will require an effort to explore the
house’s cormection to conceptions o f “postmodern space” and make a case for those cormections
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having their roots in economic circumstances, namely the globalization project.
The most important characteristic of the house’s behavior as it relates to one’s control
over the space one occupies is its instability. Navidson discovers during Exploration A, his first
entrance into the new hallway that has appeared suddenly in his living room, that the walls shift
and distances grow and shrink. During Exploration #4, it takes Holloway and his team almost
four days to finish descending the spiral staircase, but Navidson and Reston, going in to rescue
them, reach the bottom in a matter of minutes (164). Alterations o f that kind are the most obvious
o f the parallels between the behavior of the house and the experience of globalization for the
vagabonds; it is the experience o f having no control over alterations to the space they occupy.
One cause of this lack o f control is that liberalization gives corporations enormous freedom to
exploit resources, relocate populations, alter the landscape (through mining, for instance, or by
cutting down trees or damming rivers), greatly diminish environmental quality, build or destroy
infi-astructure to suit the demands of production, and, finally, make themselves the only source of
income in the locality through all these actions and then move production elsewhere at a
moment’s notice. The WTO and other free trade agreements implement policies to limit or even
eliminate the rights of the government and citizens to put a stop to policies that they see as doing
them harm.^ The control over the localities has been wrested from the local decision-making
centers and put in the hands o f corporations and institutions like the WTO. The people still living
in those localities suffer the lot o f having to watch what was once their home shift around them,
according to the dictates o f some outside will or force.
The reordering o f a space from outside is about more than the literal alteration of the
space, however. It also has much to do with imposing a certain perception o f the space; in other

^Two WTO protocols in particular, the TRIPs and the GATS, have resulted in the subversion o f democracy and in
real damage to the public w ell-being in many cases. See McMichael, Chapter 6.

Stephens 22
words, it is an issue of mapping, which is also crucial in describing the operation o f space within
the house. After Navidson and Reston’s discovery o f the much-contracted spiral staircase, the
novel provides a discussion of the subjective nature o f mapping, introducing the idea o f the
“psychological dimensions o f space” or the “sensation o f space” (175), as well as the assertion
that space is “subjectively defined and perceived” and that “distances and directions are fixed
relative to man” (169). Bauman shares this understanding of space as subjectively defined, and
discusses how the idea o f mapping emerged in part to counter or control the subjectivity of
spatial perception. His argument is that the purpose o f mapping as such was to impose an
objective understanding of the ordering of space from “a unique reference point as would be
capable o f accomplishing the miracle, of rising above, and overcoming, its own endemic
relativity” (32). In other words, it would be a view from outside o f the space itself, not limited to
a single subjective perspective within the space. M aps thus provide a view from outside that
creates transparency for those foreign to the locality, including tax collectors and other
bureaucrats. The question of subjective mapping versus mapping from an objective and exterior
position becomes complicated in relationship to the house, and the novel’s discussion o f it is
ambiguous and self-contradictory: the space may possibly respond to the influence o f subjective
perception and knowledge, yet it refuses to carry any evidence o f human presence or history
(which are negated by external mapping and even redesign). Meanwhile, its only possible logic
exists from an outside perspective, but the possibility o f such exteriority is in question.
The theory that the shifts in the house are a response to the viewer comes by way o f the
introduction of a few theorists on architecture who debate the existence of architectural space
“independently o f the casual observer,” a debate that we are told becomes blurry in relationship
to the house on Ash Tree Lane. The novel asks directly the question o f how to interpret the
relationship o f the house’s structure to its occupants: “Is it possible to think of that place as
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‘unshaped’ by human perceptions? Especially since everyone entering there finds a vision almost
completely...different from anyone else’s?” (174). The novel makes some attempt to answer the
question, as well. Earlier, the novel cites critics who assert that the distances contract so greatly
for Navidson and Reston relative to what Holloway, Wax, and Jed experienced because
“Knowledge o f the terrain on a second visit dramatically contracts the sense of distance”; in
other words, “knowledge is hot water on wool. It shrinks time and space” (167). This is in accord
with the earlier reflection, during Exploration #2, that “It is almost as if continued use...preserves
the path they walk” (85). These observations would seem to suggest that the house is a place
where “who” is still the center of spatial gravity, that the house is a place o f subjective mapping
in the extreme, with certain elements that are undeniably there, but others that change based on
the person looking at them. Moreover, Nele Bemong suggests, citing Anthony Vidler, that
Navidson’s exploration of the house was intended as a way of gaining control over that space; he
quotes Vidler as saying that “Techniques o f spatial occupation, of territorial mapping, of invasion
and surveillance are seen as the instruments o f social and individual control” (I). If he or
whoever else enters the house truly is imposing his perspective upon the space, then, as the
concept of mapping always implies, he has control over it. If the reality o f how the shifts worked
were that simple, o f course, the comparison to space under globalization would be invalid, as it
would indicate a relationship between space and its occupants that is the exact opposite o f the
operation o f space under globalization. Neither the house nor the discussion o f it, however, is
that logical. During Exploration #4, it is suggested that the shifts happen not because they are
inspired by the occupants, but because the space is unoccupied, and “unoccupied space will
never cease to change simply because nothing forbids it to do so” (120). The house, this idea
then suggests, does what it does according its own will, or to some natural process beyond our
understanding. By itself, the fact that this assertion is present in the novel does not negate the
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alternative reading of the house’s behavior. However, when put in conjunction with the fact that
much o f the house’s shifts are not and likely cannot be explained in relationship to the
perspective of a single person,^ and that the novel settles the question only by stating that
“speculation will continue for a long time over what force alters and orders the dimensions of
that place” (178), the reading o f the house as “some kind of absurd interactive Rorschach test”
need not be seen as the final word on the subject (178). Moreover, Rorschach tests involve
interpretation by an outside party, and such might also be the case with the house; it may, then,
be altering itself according to its reading of the individual - alterations that may be harmful or
helpful, and readings that may or may not be accurate or relevant to the perception o f space.
Such an interpretation of the alterations parallels how localities are reordered from
outside, done less with a lack o f awareness about the logic o f the structure as experienced from
inside, and more in a deliberate attempt to replace that logic with another for the purposes of the
outsider, who might even have an interest in erasing the history or destroying the culture of those
on the inside. The logic o f re-mapping under globalization is congruent with the behavior o f the
house, where it is, Navidson tells us, “impossible to leave a lasting trace” (162). The “blankness
o f that place, ‘the utter and perfect blankness’,” is one of the house’s most striking features
(387). With good reason, the novel cites the blankness as one reason why the space is
uninhabitable: “Nothing there provides a reason to 'linger” it says at one point (119); later, a
footnote tells us that “In those endlessly repetitive hallways and stairs, there is nothing for us to
connect with. That permanently foreign place does not excite us. It bores us” (167). The house is
what Bauman, citing Steven Flusty, calls an “interdictory space” - that is, a space “designed to

^There is, for instance, no easy explanation for why the staircase grows again just in time to prevent Navidson's
escape (289), or why it suddenly becom es m alicious and reaches out into what had seem ed to be outside o f itself in
devouring Tom, or how it can be presumed that continued use or knowledge solidifies the house's structure when it's
only because the “occupant” has any knowledge o f the structure that shifts can be observed, or how it is that groups
o f people experience the house in the same way at the same time.
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intercept and repel or filter would-be users” (20); in other words, an interdictory space is one that
conveys the message, so familiar to readers of House o f Leaves, that “This is not for you.”
Bauman lists a few of the types of interdictory spaces named by Flusty, including “slippery
space,” which “cannot be reached, due to contorted, protracted, or missing paths o f approach”;
“prickly space,” which “cannot be comfortably occupied”; and “jittery space,” which “cannot be
utilized unobserved due to active monitoring” (20). The house may qualify as all three: its
labyrinthine structure and constant shifts close off certain parts of it to any explorers; the
blankness, darkness, and cold, as well as the threat of whatever beast may lurk there, make it
uncomfortable to occupy; and the possible existence of the beast, the sense of the house having a
will of its own, and the implications of the presence of some God in (or as) the house make it
hard to claim with any certainty that the space can be used unobserved.
The purpose of establishing such interdictory spaces in real life is, according to Bauman,
“to re-forge the social extraterritoriality of the new supra-local elite into the material, bodily
isolation from locality.” He continues:
They also put a final touch on the disintegration of locally grounded forms of
togetherness and shared, communal living. The extraterritoriality o f elites is
assured in the most material fashion - their physical inaccessibility to anyone not
issued with an entry permit. (20-1)
In other words, these spaces exist to control the movements of those still bounded to the
localities, to reinforce the boundaries between the two classes, and to preclude the creation of
community or any communal experience within the space. This, too, recalls the house. “While
some portions of the house, like the Great Hall for instance, seem to offer a communal
experience,” we are told, “many inter-communicating passageways encountered by individual
members, even with only a glance, will never be re-encountered by anyone else again” (118).
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The house does not foster the kind of shared experience o f and in a space that could lend it a
coherent meaning.
Even the notion of the house as an interdictory space, however, still cannot speak to the
most terrible aspect of its utter blankness: its determination to remain that way. The house, the
novel tells us, has “a powerful ability to exorcise all things from its midst” (122). Wax says that
“It’s kind of scary...Like you stop thinking about something and it varrishes. You forget you have
pocket-zippers and pow they’re gone.” Then he warns Jed, “Don’t take nothing for granted here”
(126). This destruction o f detail runs counter to how the occupation of space is generally
understood to function. When speaking o f the un-supematural parts of the house, for instance,
the novel tells us that Navidson’s film reveals “how each room is occupied” and “how everyone
has helped apply his or her personal texture” (9). There is no personal texture in the rest of the
house. Moreover, Wax’s sense that things cease to exist within the house after he stops to think
about them is another parallel to how a sense of order imposed from outside a place destroys its
culture; after a while, the only traces of it left are in the minds of the citizens, and if they forget
it, it disappears. The novel discusses the importance o f being able to maintain the particular
within the space we occupy. At one point, the text cites Sir Joshua Reynolds, who in his 1771
Discourses on Art “argued against the importance o f the particular,” preferring instead a “global
appraisal” (119). At another point, however, the novel cites Kevin Lynch’s The Image o f the City
to argue that “emotional cognition of all environment was rooted in history, or at least personal
history,” and “the memory of past experience” (176). In other words, our comprehension of
space depends upon our having some connection to it, some way to associate it with the social
experiences that make up our history. A space that destroys the particular and the communal is
one that cannot be comprehended. Some sense of continuity would be necessary for a space to be
inhabitable, then. The novel tells us at one point, speaking o f the film as well as the house, that
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the “constant destruction of continuity” has the effect o f “prohibiting any sort o f accurate
mapmaking” (109) - which, as discussed, is exactly the point when it comes to real-world
localities, to interrupt the mapmaking done inside for the sake o f maintaining transparency from
the outside.
This brings us back to the question o f exteriority in the house. The novel makes it very
clear that if there is an outside to the house, there is no way for the viewers o f The Navidson
Record to access it. The difference in perspectives o f the labyrinth by those inside o f it or outside
o f it, so significant to the discussion of local spaces under globalization, is noted explicitly in the
novel through a citation from Penelope Reed D oob’s The Idea o f the Labyrinth: from Classical
Antiquity through the Middle Ages:
[MJaze-treaders, whose vision ahead and behind is severely constricted and
fragmented, suffer confusion, whereas maze-viewers, who see the pattern o f the
whole, from above or in a diagram, are dazzled by its complex artistry. What you
see depends on where you stand, and thus...labyrinths...simultaneously incorporate
order and disorder. (113-4)
“Unfortunately,” we are told immediately after, “the dichotomy between those who participate
inside and those who view from the outside breaks down” with regard to the house, because “no
one ever sees that labyrinth in its entirety.” Moreover, we are told that “anyone lost within must
recognize that no one, not even a god or an Other, comprehends the entire maze and so therefore
can never offer a definitive answer” (115). This implication of the impossibility o f exteriority in
the house has caught the attention o f several critics and become an important premise in their
work. Mark B. N. Hansen, for example, takes the assertion that “All solutions then are
necessarily personal” in the labyrinth of the house (115) as part o f the basis for his discussion of
orthography, mediation, and the singularity o f each reading experience (627), and Natalie
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Hamilton also seizes upon the question of exteriority in her discussion of the literary labyrinths
upon which the novel is built.
Hamilton questions whether the implied impossibility of a solution disqualifies both the
house and novel from being categorized as labyrinths because of the lack o f an objective solution
offered through exteriority (11). Although Hamilton does not attempt to explicitly answer her
own question, she points out the lack of certainty in the novel’s assertion that there can be no one
who comprehends the entire maze. The novel cites Ovid’s Metamorphoses upon introducing the
idea that a labyrinth’s “complexity may exceed the imagination of even the designer.” The
trouble is, the quoted passage (“So Daedalus made those innumerable winding passages, and was
him self scarce able to find his way back to the place of entry, so deceptive was the enclosure he
had built”) indicates that Daedalus did know the solution to the labyrinth, even if he struggled
with it (115), and Hamilton, though she states that “Daedalus’s Cretan labyrinth was so
complicated that even its architect could not find his way out,” emphasizes that the labyrinth
nonetheless had a solution (11). So, though the novel tells us that “Navidson’s house seems a
perfect example” o f an unsolvable labyrinth (italics added), the example it cites is not of an
unsolvable labyrinth, and in fact Hamilton suggests that being unsolvable makes a structure
something other than a labyrinth, anyway (11). The seriousness with which the house’s seeming
lack o f exteriority has been taken may, thus, be going too far.
Though we are told that Holloway is desperate to find “some kind o f indication of an
outsideness to that place,” suggesting that such an indication is impossible to find, we are also
told on the same page that all the walls are “potentially hiding and thus hinting at a possible
exterior” (119). What all this comes down to, then, is that the idea o f an outside view of the
labyrinth is not actually refuted in any concrete way. Instead, the problem is that from inside,
where we always are, there is no way to know; the outside may be ontologically real, but it is
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never actually seen. All the same, our inability to encounter it does not make speaking about the
transparency of the house from outside impossible. In fact, it only reinforces the idea that the
boundary between the territorial and the extraterritorial is, by design, impenetrable. When the
elite divorce themselves from a locality, Bauman notes, public spaces - “agoras and forums in
their various manifestations, places where agendas are set, private affairs are made public,
opinions are formed, tested and confirmed, judgments are put together and verdicts are passed” all followed with them (24). There is no basis inside the locality by which the people may even
understand that an external order is being imposed upon them. The “outside” from which
decisions about such issues as “right and wrong, beauty and ugliness, proper and improper,
useful and useless” are offered are “never to be penetrated by any but a most inquisitive eye”
(25-6). Hansen hints at this lack of transparency in his discussion of exteriority in the house: “the
impossibility of an external, first-order observation of the entire system functions to ennoble
second-order observations that take this very impossibility...as their content” (627). In other
words, the house is only understood as a collection of observations from the inside that are
informed by the impossibility of any external understanding. Although, as mentioned, Hansen
takes the “impossibility o f external, first order observation” literally, his statement speaks just as
clearly to the limited perception of those on the inside, and how the lack o f transparency creates
the illusion that there is no exteriority. There is transparency from the outside in; from the inside
out, one cannot even see for sure if there is an out.
IV. Postmodern Space: Theory and Trope
The confusion over exteriority in the house recalls certain ideas of postmodern space as
articulated by Fredric Jameson, namely in his observations of the hiding of entrances and exits
and the tendency o f postmodern buildings to replicate or even to house spaces or structures that
exist in the outside world (39-45). O f course, it would have been difficult to leave a discussion of
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the operation o f space in such an exuberantly postmodern work as House o f Leaves without
accounting for the relationship o f space in the novel to these notions o f postmodern space, and
also determining the relationship of “postmodern space” to “globalized space” - not only
because the connection between economics and space is explicit in Jameson’s work, but also
because it would not do to appear to fail to address such an obvious interpretation o f the novel.
For the purposes o f this discussion, the “postmodern” in “postmodern space” will refer, as
Jameson intended, to the logic of “consumer or multinational capitalism” (1974). Jameson’s
definition o f the term is useful because this discussion addresses itself to the relationship of
space to economics, in the form of neoliberal globalization, also known as multinational
capitalism. The connection of Jameson to Bauman to the house on Ash Tree Lane furthers the
argument concerning the connection of globalization to the house and solidifies that the use of
space in the novel has significance beyond its relatedness to postmodern fictional tropes
involving space, including the use o f the labyrinth.
Russell Daylight writes that the “enduring thesis of Jameson’s Postmodernism is that any
experience o f urban or architectural disorientation is profoundly related to the inability to map
oneself within the world space of transnational capitalism” (1). Certainly that is, at this point, a
familiar concept, and one that is also vital to Bauman’s discussion o f space as it relates to the
tourist-vagabond relationship; however, Bauman writes much less specifically about the types of
spaces to which his ideas apply, focusing as he does more on the type o f people who occupy
them. In his book Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic o f Late Capitalism, Jameson connects
the disorientation o f the postmodern period metaphorically to the labyrinth - specifically the
aforementioned Daedalus’s: “Postmodern theory...has the wit...to hold to its Ariadne’s thread on
its way through what may not turn out to be a labyrinth at all, but a gulag or perhaps a shopping
mall” (xi). Jameson draws for us, then, the connection between postmodern space and the
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labyrinth, and thus, if we can take the extra step o n our own, the house. Jameson also makes a
point o f defining the new social order as one determined in part by a marked difference in the
“interrelatedness between time and space” (154), which refers for Jameson to “the displacement
o f time, the spatialization of the temporal” (156). In other words, Jameson is concerned with the
transformation of time into an eternal present that exists not as a moment in time but as a
moment in space (27), resulting in the loss of the sense of “deep memory” and history that was
so important to earlier social paradigms, now replaced with expressions of nostalgia that exist
only in the present and thus can only be enacted in space and not time (154-6). This analysis of
the relationship of space and time in the postmodern era is much different on the surface from
Baum an’s concept of the Great War o f Independence from Space - that is, the shrinking of
distances through the shrinking of the time needed to conquer them - but both authors are
documenting the same phenomenon. If the world has indeed become one where time has been
spatialized, then the prominence of mobility in determining class position for Bauman makes
sense; within a world made only o f space and not o f time, having control over your position in
space becomes o f utmost importance, replacing older ideas of community or history that depend
upon a sense of time that is capable o f extending into the past. And despite Bauman’s
complication o f his ideas of space and time with talk of how tourists live in time and vagabonds
live in space (88), the spatialization o f the temporal accounts for both experiences, both the sense
of “going through a succession o f episodes hygienically insulated from their past as well as their
future” as a result of the “shrinking of space” having “abolishe[d] the flow o f time” on the one
hand, and the sense of time being “void” and “tie[d] down” by the “heavy, resilient,
untouchable” reality of unconquerable space on the other (88). The relationship o f space to time
is consistent for both groups; it is only the relationship o f space and time to the people that
differs.
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But of course Jameson’s work is not focused on some abstract relationship between space
and time but rather the very concrete, lived experience of certain spaces within the world of
multinational capitalism. As for Bauman, this experience begins with the destruction of the order
which existed in the space before: “this new multinational downtown effectively abolished the
older ruined city fabric which is violently replaced” (14). More important, however - once again,
just as for Bauman - is the way the new spatial order is perceived by those inside of it: “this
strange new surface in its own peremptory way renders our older systems o f perception of the
city somehow archaic and aimless, without offering another in their place” (14). In other words,
there is no way for us to comprehend the postmodern space from inside of it. Just as with
labyrinths in general and the house in particular. Jam eson’s analysis comes from his own
personal experience of being inside the Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles. Daylight writes,
“Jameson walks through (or in fact, is moved through) a physical structure, and becomes
disoriented among its people-moving devices, reduced scale landscape and semantic
depthlessness” (1). Jameson writes that this new space represented by the Bonaventure, a kind of
“postmodern hyperspace,” surpasses the ability o f human beings to locate or orient themselves
within their environment (44), necessitating “the invention and projection o f a global cognitive
mapping” (54) - in other words, a mapping from outside of the new postmodern space, which
has come to encompass the entire world. Jameson is concerned, as are Hansen and Hamilton
with regard to the house, o f the impossibility in this new space of any exteriority; he sees
postmodernism as having dissolved distinctions between inside and outside, leaving us incapable
of occupying any position outside o f the system from which we may look upon the whole and
understand or critique it (98, 48). As with discussions o f exteriority in the novel, however, this
inability to access any outside should not be taken as evidence that no outside exists, nor
certainly - for it is exactly Jam eson’s point that this space is created by the capitalist system, that
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“what we have heen calling postmodern...space...has genuine historical (and socioeconomic)
reality as a third great expansion of capitalism around the glohe” (49) - that we can see the
changes in space as heing provoked naturally from the inside rather than deliherately from the
outside. Jameson is, in fact, critiquing the narrative of postmodernism for making it seem as if
there can he no outside, and thus disguising structural forces as natural ones. Across all the
discussions, it remains the same that those inside have no way of looking out, hut that that does
not mean that there is no outside toward which to look.
It should he noted that Daylight is critical o f Jam eson’s discussion o f postmodern space,
claiming that its conclusions are “impatient” and the actual connection between the space and the
system is not clearly drawn (1):
The question o f exactly how physical disorientation is conjoined to political, or
even moral disorientation, is not fully developed hy Jameson. Do physical
structures follow political structures, or is it the other way around? Are hoth
produced simultaneously hy a third force? Or is the relation merely metaphorical?
(2)

Daylight’s purpose is not to refute Jameson’s claims, however, hut to make a more accurate
connection, to state more clearly whether postmodern space (such as the Bonaventure Hotel) can
be most accurately said to he produced hy, to resemble, or to he an example o f transnational
space (4-5). To do so. Daylight replicates Jameson’s tour o f a postmodern space, replacing the
Bonaventure with the Penrith Plaza shopping center in Sydney (8). Putting less emphasis on the
feeling of disorientation than Jameson, Daylight makes observations that correspond both to the
characteristics of postmodern space as Jameson describes it and, more importantly, to the
behavior o f Navidson’s house.
For instance. Daylight writes that “In the ‘space’ o f Penrith Plaza, notions of centre and
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periphery are obliterated” (9-10). The novel, meanwhile, dedicates a number o f footnotes to the
discussion o f the confused role of the “center” in the house, following a passage relating
Holloway, Jed, and Wax’s inability to find a “purpose” to the house. The footnotes, including a
citation from Derrida’s Writing and Structure and a passage from Christian Norberg-Schulz’s
Existence, Space & Architecture that reaffirms the importance of “subjectively centered” space
and subjective mapping, remind us that “the notion o f a structure without a center represents the
unthinkable itse lf’ (112-3). The house (and the film, and the novel), like Penrith Plaza, subverts
the role of the center: “From the outset o f The Navidson Record, we are involved in a labyrinth,
meandering from one celluloid cell to the next...in hopes o f finding a solution, a centre, a sense
of whole” (114). And this confusion o f the center is not even the most striking o f the parallels
that can be observed in Daylight’s article. Perhaps most interesting is his statement that “the
visual surfaces within Penrith Plaza refuse to convey any meaning with a historical dimension”
(10). This o f course recalls the house’s utter blankness and refusal to bear evidence o f human
occupation, and also serves as a reminder o f the question o f time and space as discussed by both
Jameson and Bauman. Citing Meaghan Morris, Daylight notes that the landscape o f shopping
centers is one o f “constant renovation and renewal” (another striking parallel to the house) that
gives them a sense of “what Morris calls ‘the perpetual present of consumption’”; he goes on to
say that “the distinctly depressed feeling I experienced at Penrith Plaza might not have been the
loss o f spatial but of historical orientation” (10). In other words, he experiences the postmodern
world as one o f spatialized time, a world where time has stopped and only space, and the
freedom to move within it, still exist.
D aylight’s observations are also better suited than Jameson’s for drawing connections
between his experiences of the architecture o f postmodern space and the globalized space of
localities as discussed by Bauman, as Daylight chooses to focus on the mall as representative of
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the “massive transfer o f commerce from High Street small businesses to transnational
corporations” (11). Echoing Bauman’s concerns about localities being left vacant o f political
activity and decision-making power in the wake o f the migration o f the elite, Daylight writes:
When one...considers the outright interdiction of political activities...in such
centres, it is clear that the ‘mailing o f Australia’ enacts a shift from more public
forms of citizenship towards a consumerist culture o f safety, conformity, and
exclusion. (11)
Daylight’s less metaphorical explanation o f the influence o f transnational corporations on his
particular piece of postmodern space might appear to complicate the connection being drawn in
this project between globalization and the house on Ash Tree Lane, given that the house cannot
be understood as having literally been ordered from outside o f itself by literal transnational
corporations or global financial institutions. However, in helping to concretize the connection
between the characteristics of postmodern space and the economic forces that shape them,
Daylight’s argument not only bolsters Bauman’s, but helps to reinforce that the sense of
disorientation created by globalization is not at issue. Instead, the rendering o f the vast majority
o f the world’s people as mere spectators to political, economic, environmental, and, yes,
geographic changes to the localities they once called home is of primary concern. The question
o f having a say regarding one’s relationship to space divides Navidson and Delial and informs
this discussion o f the novel.
Having located this discussion relative to other and more famous discourses on
postmodern space and accounted for the influence they may have had, it is also important to
address the possible influence on the novel of existing tropes in postmodern fiction that relate to
space. Doing so justifies finding a socioeconomic basis for what could more easily be perceived
as simply following in the footsteps o f and commenting on other postmodern works. This is
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especially important because of Hamilton’s work, which she claims is intended to “provide
partial blueprints for this house by examining the foundations on which it is built” (3). The intent
here is not to argue that the connection to past literary works does not exist, as to attempt such an
argument would be to disregard the actual text. N or will it serve to argue that the prominence of
labyrinths within postmodern fiction is also a reflection of the economic forces of global
neoliberal capitalism, as supporting that claim would require reaching far beyond the limits of
this particular project. There is no way to properly address here whether the reading of the house
as reflecting literary history is in competition or congruence with the reading o f the house as
reflecting material history. 1 only suggest that a reading emphasizing the literary “foundation” on
which the house has been built cannot account for as much o f the novel as a reading that puts
more emphasis on the relationship of the house to the particulars o f Navidson’s circumstances.
Introducing her focus on the novel’s literary antecedents, Hamilton writes:
Despite the unheimlich quality of the novel, its roots can be traced back to
familiar themes and important literary predecessors, most notably Jorge Luis
Borges. Danielewski’s use o f the labyrinth as a theme, symbol, and form, and the
mise-en-abyme structure o f the text within a text within a text, as well as direct
allusions, underscore his debt to the work o f Borges. (3)
In fleshing out this parallel with Borges, Hamilton places emphasis on Chapter Nine o f the text
(“Labyrinth”), as well as on the multiple layers o f diegesis within the novel, though largely only
to the extent that they help to create the sense o f the work as its own labyrinth. In turn, she
deemphasizes the novel’s pervading sense o f unhomeliness or uncanniness. The labyrinth - a
concept that should indeed be central to any discussion o f the nature and structure o f the house is thus given primary attention in her analysis. There is no denying the maze-like nature of the
actual house - even when the disorientation is the result o f its size, which Hamilton notes is a

Stephens 37
variation on the labyrinth that is found in Borges as well (10) - nor that the house serves to some
degree as a metaphor for “self-exploration” (5). Moreover, the ideas of inside and outside as they
pertain to the labyrinth are, as has been discussed, of great relevance. However, certain striking
facets of the house’s behavior are not accounted fo r by the idea of the labyrinth itself: its
existence as a “spatial anomaly” (11); its transformation of the un-supematural part of
Navidson’s house in what appears to be a deliberate attempt to murder the family (successful in
the case o f Tom); the “absence” o f the minotaur; and, most importantly, as suggested by the
attention paid here to the concept of spatialized (and thus ahistorical) time, its erasure (or
consumption) of everything inside of it. Moreover, the concept o f the labyrinth is only given
prominence in Chapter Nine. Although Hamilton is not wrong to suggest that it remains
important throughout the rest of The Navidson Record and throughout all the levels o f narrative,
the “form” o f the labyrinth is only imitated within that one chapter, so as to leave the typography
capable o f imitating other forms and actions during the rest o f the novel. Despite the intertwining
o f the different narratives, the path from beginning to end is clear. Although there are, as
Hamilton notes, multiple pathways,'* outside o f Chapter Nine - where the footnotes all end up
leading back to the X (code for “unable to proceed” (582)) on the first page o f the chapter (107),
thus forcing the readers into an endless loop - the rest o f the novel is not marked by, in
Hamilton’s words, “the danger of following a chosen path and becoming lost in the
convolutions” (12). In short, certainly the concept o f the labyrinth, inherited from his literary
predecessors, is important in Danielewski’s novel. It does not, however, define the novel, and the
idea o f the labyrinth is hardly sufficient to account for the house itself, let alone the text, and
many of those elements for which it does not account are those that are most significant to the

"The choice o f when to read Appendices II-D and II-E - which the reader is offered the choice to turn to on 172
based on whether s/he “w ishes to interpret Mr. Truant on his or her own” or thinks “they would profit from a better
understanding o f his past” - is the most significant o f these alternative pathways.
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parallels between the house and the human consequences of globalization.
V. Meaning and Unhomeliness
In particular, the house’s blankness is not given sufficient attention in Hamilton’s
discussion of the house as a labyrinth, despite the foregrounding of that knowledge within
Chapter Nine. One of the most striking o f the typographic innovations in the novel and in that
chapter specifically is the “window” that first appears on page 119 that contains the text of
footnote 144. This text contains nothing more than a long list of the housing fixtures that are not
present in the house; it is nearly exhaustive in its detail, and it serves to reinforce the startling
and disturbing nature of the nothingness contained within the house. “Picture that. In your
dreams,” the struck-out final line o f the footnote reads (141), emphasizing the house’s blankness
as a source o f horror and recalling the “nightmares” of the novel’s first line (xi). The nothingness
o f the house seemingly became the most striking feature for Navidson as well, as he warns off
anyone curious enough to go looking for the house that “There’s nothing there. Beware” (4). And
although connections have already been made between the house’s blankness and propensity for
erasing any evidence of human presence and sense o f history and what happens to localities
under globalization, it is something we must return to once again, more deeply, because of one
important aspect o f Bauman’s argument: when control over the locality is usurped by external
forces, when the very space itself can be reordered according to the will o f some transnational
corporation or global financial institution which is not accountable to and in fact will never even
meet the citizens o f that locality, the result is the destruction o f old systems o f meaning and of
the ability of the populace to generate meaning for themselves at all. The result is anomie,
normlessness in the most literal sense of the word. Those inside their localities have their homes
transformed into something akin to the house on Ash Tree Lane, void of meaning and history and
all personal texture.
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Bauman’s discussion o f this condition is contained within his larger discussion of the
imposing of order on space from outside for the sake of transparency. Echoing Jameson’s
observation that the “new multinational downtown effectively abolished the older ruined city
fabric which is violently replaced” (14), Bauman argues that the makers o f these new cities,
designed from abstract utopian visions, wished to replace the existing reality with one o f their
own design, and notes that, o f course, “The ‘small print’ of every project o f a city yet to be
created ab nihilo implied the destruction of a city already in existence” (37). Like Jameson,
Bauman is concerned about the realities of lives lived within these new cities and observes the
problems they face - problems which recall Navidson’s house and his struggles inside of it.
Bauman notes that the residents of the new cities “faced an almost insoluble identity problem”
because they cannot locate themselves within the new, blank, ahistorical space (46); they have, in
a sense, been displaced despite having been allowed to stay put. There are connections in this
notion to Navidson’s inability to assess his life and his overall sense that he is no longer the
person he once was (or thought he was), and further to the way that problem radiates from him to
Johnny and the reader, but more important at the moment is this sense of dislocation within one’s
own home.
This concept is introduced in the novel early on by way o f a passage from Martin
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit or Being and Time, which provides us a first connection between the
house and the term ’'unheim lichkeif’ or “uncanniness” (25). The translation of the passage
offered tells us that the uncarmy - which may be a term that is more familiar as a Freudian
concept also commonly referred to as the “return o f the repressed” - may also be taken to mean
“not-being-at-home” (25). In other words, the uncanny is a sense o f unfamiliarity or
unsettledness in a place or situation that should be familiar; Julian Wolfreys writes, “ [T]he
uncanny is the uncanny precisely to the extent that the sensation comes about in places where
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one should feel most secure, or with which one is most familiar” (240). It is a feeling of
alienation within the least alien of spaces or circumstances, o f not being at home within one’s
own house. “That which is uncanny or unheimlich,'' the novel tells us, “is neither homey nor
protective, nor comforting nor familiar” (28). Certainly that describes the house, which resists
occupation, causes death, creates anxiety, and is endlessly alien. The connection between the
house and the uncanny is so obvious that it comes up in Karen’s discussion with a fictionalized
Harold Bloom; asked to describe the house. Bloom responds, “Unheimlich - o f course” (364),
and he discusses the concept more in depth earlier, quoting his own work. The Anxiety o f
Influence, in order to provide the Freudian definition o f the term and emphasize that the feeling
o f unfamiliarity is actually caused by the return o f something which is familiar but has been
“estranged” through “the process of repression.” For him, the house is not alien in its blankness
but “endlessly familiar” (259). This introduction o f both Freud’s and Heidegger’s use of the term
within the novel itself emphasizes the need to clarify how exactly the term is being used in this
analysis, and what interpretation of the relationship o f the concept to the house is being accepted
as the premise for the rest o f this discussion.
O f course, there is not necessarily a contradiction inherent in the deployment o f both
definitions of the uncanny, especially as we can see each in operation in both the house and in
globalized space as Bauman describes it. It is true that the house is something alien, representing
as it does a “spatial violation” and a mathematical impossibility as well as “an intrusion” (24).
There is no way to feel at home in a place that cannot exist. The sense of unfamiliarity is added
to by the geographical shifts and by the sense of danger. Where the difficulty comes in is in
assessing whether the utter and perfect blankness o f the house is something we may read as, as
Bloom suggests, endless familiarity or as, as it was suggested previously, one of the house’s most
alienating and horrifying characteristics. O f course, Freud’s definition allows that it is both,
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which is in fact Bloom’s point, but accepting B loom ’s interpretation nonetheless complicates the
parallel between the house and globalization even while furthering the central argument of this
project. Bloom ’s discussion of the uncanny helps to suggest that the house is “endlessly familiar”
to Navidson, that his feeling of unhomeliness inside o f it arises because o f the return of the
repressed, which, Wolfreys writes, “comes to light in the most familiar places” (241). Following
from this, the house is uncanny for Navidson because it brings forth old sources o f anxiety and
discontentment, namely his guilt over Delial. The house may, by this reading, in fact only exist
because N avidson’s attempt to create a new home, an “outpost set against the transience of the
world” (23), calls forward his repressed feelings about Delial and uncertainty about himself and
his own life and worth. That the house takes the specific form it does reflects the specificity of
Delial’s situation and her relationship to space. But although the drawing o f this connection
between Navidson’s psyche and the house is valuable, it is complicated in itself (as will be
explored) by other elements o f the house’s history, and it also elides the connection already
suggested between the vagabonds’ experience o f globalization and the uncanny. Worse, it would
seem to require a psychological explanation for the feeling of unhomeliness within the new space
of globalization that accounts for the repressed and estranged feelings or knowledge of each
individual. It would be easy, valid, and helpful to argue that globalized space is also, in its own
blankness and homogeneity, just as “endlessly familiar” to those who occupy it as the house, and
thus, in the same way, endlessly uncanny and horrifying. However, the question o f the repressed,
o f what exactly is being called forward by the space’s endless familiarity, creates an obstacle for
the argument, given that the feeling o f uncanniness under globalization is widely (though maybe
not universally) shared by those without power to control the changes to their world. What is it
that has been repressed for these people? Is it shared only in the sense that we all have
unconscious and therefore repressed feelings, capable o f surfacing, or is the content o f the
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repressed in this case also somehow shared, part o f some collective memory and identity that
once made the locality a community? And what, exactly, in the changes made to their spaces
calls forward the repressed?
Ultimately, the problem for the Freudian definition of the uncanny is that it, as invoked
by Bloom, confuses cause and effect and creates a tautology. The description of the house as
“endlessly familiar” is not actually as clear and obvious as it first seems. The fictional Bloom
justifies the use of “familiar” because the house is “endlessly repetitive. Hallways, corridors,
rooms, over and over again” (359). Thus, it is “familiar” in the sense that it is homogenized. Any
previously unseen part recalls parts already explored. This sense of familiarity is a fundamental
characteristic of the structure of the house that has nothing to do with the psychology o f anyone
entering it. The house is not familiar because it is uncanny, in the sense that it causes anxiety
connected to the return of the repressed; it is familiar simply in the sense that it looks like itself,
and looking like itself is, in turn, one o f the causes of the sense of dislocation and horror that we
associated with the uncanny. Bloom, intent on seeing the house as a representation instead of an
actual place, insists on seeing its stmcture as having been determined by its meaning, making the
house’s structure endlessly repetitive so that it may serve as a symbol of familiarity and, thus, the
uncanny; uncanniness becomes, in this argument, the reason for the house, instead of the house
being the reason for the feelings o f uncanniness. If we were to take his invocation of Freud as the
basis for our ovm interpretation of the house, then, which is rooted in treating it as an actual
space, we would end up with a circular argument - that the house invokes such feelings of
uncanniness because it is a symbol for the uncanny. This is a useless argument even to explain
the house itself, let alone to explain the parallels between the house and globalized space, not
least because the alterations to space under globalization are conducted for logical material
reasons (namely, efficiency and profit), the consequence and not the purpose o f which is the
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displacement of people (even those who never have to move). For the purposes of this argument,
we must recognize uncanniness as the result of and not the logic behind the arrangement of
space, including the space’s endless familiarity.
Of course, Bloom is not the only one to apply the Freudian concept o f the uncanny to the
house, or to the novel as a whole. Nele Bemong’s entire analysis of the novel is an exploration of
the role played by the uncanny, and his emphasis is on the psychological implications of the
term. O f course, as discussed earlier, Bemong also pays attention to what he and Vidler before
him call the “spatial uncanny” - that is, according to Vidler, “one no longer entirely dependent
on the temporal dislocations o f suppression and return, or the invisible slippages between a sense
o f the homely and the unhomely, but displayed in the abyssal repetitions of the imaginary void”
(1). This statement would at first appear to give us a definition o f the uncanny that moves us
away from unanswerable questions about the role o f the repressed and toward a grounding o f the
discussion in the actual structure o f the house itself, until it becomes clear that Bemong is, like
Bloom, addressing the house as a representation instead o f a concrete thing against which people
react. This tension between the house-as-symbol and the house-as-place still acts as a sticking
point in the parallels between the house and globalized space, because o f course the house is
both a symbol and an outgrowth as well as a cause of anxiety. In treating the house as a
consequence of Navidson and Karen’s psychological problems, though, rather than as an
abstraction, Bemong’s argument helps to further connect the house with Navidson’s psyche. For
instance, Bemong observes:
According to Heidegger, the post-war human being explicitly experiences the
world as a homeless place. That is precisely the reason why we so obstinately try
to create a safe home. As a war photographer, Navidson had had a similar
experience o f fundamental "unsettledness", and it was precisely for this reason
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, that he wanted to set up an ‘outpost’ against the hostile and transitory world. (1).
Of course, Navidson’s experience of “unsettledness” in his career is not simply his observation
of the chaos of the various unstable regions to which he traveled; that interpretation would, in
fact, require we ignore that Navidson loved his career and the excitement it offered, did not feel
unsettled because o f it, and did not want to give it up; in fact, without Karen’s ultimatum, he
likely would not have done so. His experience o f being unsettled, rather, was the “almost
insoluble identity problem” that he experienced after D elial’s death, a sense of a lack of
orientation or awareness of his place in the world. This sense of dislocation recalls both how
Bauman describes the experience of globalization and how Ernst Jentsch, whom Bemong also
cites (by way o f Vidler), defines the uncanny, describing it as “a fundamental insecurity brought
about by ‘a lack o f orientation,’ a sense of something new, foreign, and hostile invading an old,
familiar, customary world” (1). For Bemong it is Jentsch and Freud, rather than Heidegger and
Freud, whose competing definitions of the uncanny flesh out the novel, with the question being
whether the uncanny is something new (Jentsch) or something old (Freud).
When framed in this way, it is hard to disagree with the value o f Freud’s definition, as
otherwise the house would have nothing to do with Delial, or with Navidson at all other than
how it affects him and makes him feel not-at-home. There is far too much of the novel itself
dedicated to exploring N avidson’s back-story and emotional baggage - and his preoccupation
with Delial in particular is too explicitly stated - to make such a reading particularly compelling.
Bemong agrees, and states that he sees the novel as beginning with Jentsch’s idea that the
uncanny results from the intellectual uncertainty created by the intrusion o f the house upon
Navidson’s life, and progresses, as we get to know Navidson, toward the Freudian understanding
of the uncanny in the connections drawn between Navidson’s past and the house (1). This is
probably the simplest and most concise articulation o f the operation of the uncanny within the
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text, but it still leaves us with what might be a contradiction or at least a coincidence for which
we must account: the house is both bom out of and inspires the feeling of unheimlichkeit, leaving
cause and effect still tangled. Of course, it stands to reason that a structure that exists to embody
uncarminess would thus also be uncanny, but we may do better than that in sorting out this
complication by finally and firmly establishing the extent to which the house is and is not
dependent on Navidson for its existence within The Navidson Record.
The un-supematural part of Navidson’s house was o f course there before Navidson and
his family moved in; the house was “supposedly built back in 1720” and had been occupied by
“approximately .37 owners every year” (21). The real question is whether anyone else
encountered the strangeness experienced by Navidson, his family, his friends, and anyone else
who entered the place while the Navidsons lived there. There are some implications that they
may have: “most” of the house’s occupants “were traumatized in some way” (21). Some
previous owners sold the place in search o f something “a little smaller” (29). Another “said the
place was too roomy” and yet another “called it ‘unstable’” (409). Maybe most significant o f all,
a diary from January of 1610 reveals the discovery o f stairs in the area where the house now sits,
and thus “may offer some proof that Navidson’s extraordinary property existed almost four
hundred years ago,” though it cannot explain “why that particular location proved so significant”
(414). Although the novel then goes on to say that what mattered is not the particular location but
that any one single place, wherever it was, should prove so significant (414), this existence of the
house before Navidson is still troubling. Even after we embrace the novel’s simple declaration
that “Navidson’s psychology profoundly influenced the nature of those rooms and hallways” but
is not likely to have “conjured up that place,” which allows us to consider the house both as a
thing unto itself and as a manifestation o f Navidson’s issues at the same time, there is no way in
this analysis to answer the question o f why the place exists or why Navidson, with his particular
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psychological haggage, moved in there. We do not have to, however, if we take the novel’s
declaration at face value, and if we remember that we have no actual details as to what the house
was like or how it hehaved before Navidson moved in besides that there was something
“otherly” about it. We are told early into The Navidson Record not to use knowledge of what
happens later in the film to read subtext or foreshadowing into what happens earlier, in the
discussion o f Chad’s confession that the quiet of his new environment makes him anxious: “Too
often his response has been misread by those aware of the film’s ending” (9). The same principle
can he applied to the statements by other owners o f the house being too large; it is a connection
we draw with our knowledge o f Navidson’s experience, not from any real knowledge of theirs.
The only insight we gain into the house’s behavior comes from The Navidson Record, which
means that there is not actually any evidence to suggest that the house cannot he said to he
responding to Navidson’s psyche. However, as discussed earlier in the exploration of the
subjective ordering of space, there is also no evidence to suggest that the house reacts differently
to everyone who enters it during the filming of The Navidson Record. As we must note a certain
level of stability before we can emphasize Navidson’s experiences over, for instance,
Holloway’s, or Reston’s, this lack o f evidence is significant. There is still no explicit statement to
the effect that the house has within The Navidson Record shaped itself according to Navidson’s
psychological haggage and his alone, but it is suggested.
Besides the fact that we can (as demonstrated) connect the behavior o f the house
specifically to the experiences o f vagabonds such as Delial, and Navidson’s engagement with the
house very specifically to his guilt over her death, we can see Navidson as the dominating if not
exactly stabilizing force for two reasons. The first is his role as the owner o f the house, the
patriarch of the family, the initiator o f the entire Ash Tree Lane experiment. The other is his role
as the filmmaker, in control o f what the audience sees even when he is not the one filming. With
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regard to the first: as mentioned previously, some attention is paid to the Navidson’s ownership
of the house in chapter XVII (“Reasons”) during the examination of the Kellog-Antwerk Claim.
Jennifer Kellog and Isabelle Antwerk argue that Navidson was driven, in his return to the house,
hy some need to assert ownership o f it. There is a good case made to dismiss that interpretation,
citing examples o f actions Navidson might have taken to assert his ownership that he did not
take, such as buying Karen’s half or presenting him self to the media as the house’s proprietor.
What the narrator o f The Navidson Record fails to consider, however, is that Navidson may not
have sensed the need to do any of those things to feel as though he owned it, which fits with
what Kellog and Antwerk actually point out: “even though Navidson and Karen own the house
together (both their names appear on the mortgage), Navidson frequently implies that he is the
sole proprietor” (385). Much more important, the novel makes the same implication; it often
refers to the house as “Navidson’s house,” as for instance in the section on De La Warr’s diary
that calls it “Navidson’s extraordinary property” (414). Navidson claims ownership o f the house,
he defends his claim on it (for instance, in attempting to assert authority over Holloway and his
crew), neither Karen nor the children, who also occupy the house, make their own explicit claims
o f ownership, and the novel is perfectly willing to offer him the right to his claim in the language
used within it. As far as The Navidson Record is concerned, the house as we witness it is
Navidson’s house, and what it means to us is thus what it means to Navidson.
This sense o f Navidson as the dominant figure in the house is only added to hy his role as
the “author” of The Navidson Record and the two shorts that preceded it (6). Much time is spent
early in the novel establishing Navidson’s talents as a filmmaker, praising his editing choices,
and demonstrating, ultimately, the control he had over The Navidson Record. It is his vision that
we see. Therefore, Zampano is right to conclude that “Considering his own history, talent and
emotional background, only Navidson could have gone as deep as he did and still have
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successfully brought that vision back” (23). It may create yet another cause-and-effect difficulty
to assert that because Navidson determines what we see o f the house, Navidson also determines
what there is to see o f the house, and it would not serve to become confused about whether this
discussion is treating the house as something that exists within The Navidson Record
independent from its being filmed or written about. Thus, to clarify: if the house orders itself
according to whoever is inside it, whoever is exploring it, that person can be said, in a sense, to
always be Navidson. No one enters the house unaccompanied by his actual person except upon
his direction, and they always carry with them one o f his video cameras. The camera is an
extension o f Navidson’s sight, his way o f seeing without being physically present. Every
instance o f Navidson’s observing moments on film for which he was absent in reality, such as
Karen kissing Wax (96), reminds us that filming is a way o f expanding his vision, and that is
most true with regard to the exploration o f the house. The house’s other explorers filming
whatever there is to be filmed, and thus letting Navidson see whatever there is to be seen, is one
of the primary purposes of the expedition; it allows Navidson to be the one to solve the house’s
mystery even when he himself is absent. If the house does truly respond in some way to those
within it, as suggested, then Navidson’s role as the filmmaker allows him to be central to how the
house orders itself, and thus determine what there is to be seen as well as what we see.
What has been established, then, is that the house exists as some sort o f unexplainable
anomaly without Navidson’s presence, but that its particular structure has much to do with
Navidson’s history and psychological issues. The notion o f the house as a kind o f strangeness
that intrudes upon Navidson and his family, and anyone else occupying that particular property
as least as far back as 1610, speaks of an uncanniness that has little to do with Navidson, a
disruption o f familiarity and homeliness by, in part, the intellectual uncertainty o f which Jentsch
speaks. Meanwhile, that the house confronts Navidson with his guilt over Delial and his
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uncertainty about himself and forces him to face some o f his demons is an example o f the
uncanny in the more Freudian sense. If that were where the application o f the term stopped, the
whole discussion would be much simpler. However, Navidson’s confusion about himself, a sense
o f dislocation or disorientation within his own life, is also an example o f unhomeliness. Finally,
and more important within the novel and within this discussion, the house as Navidson
encounters it - the impossibility o f its size, its instability, its utter and perfect blankness - is also
uncanny in a way that has nothing to do with Navidson’s specific psychological issues except in
the sense that it replicates the kind o f ordering of space, and the psychological effects o f that
ordering, that occurs as part of the globalization project as experienced by a vagabond like
Delial. In that way, then, the house is both uncanny and familiar (that is, rooted in Navidson’s
repressed emotions), but not, for the purposes o f this discussion, uncanny because it is familiar.
That ordering o f space is uncanny with or without Navidson’s history; its uncanniness is simply
more significant and explainable in light o f the connection that can be drawn between the way
the space is ordered and Navidson’s dominant site o f anxiety: Delial.
The loss of meaning-negotiating capacity, to use Bauman’s term, in newly-globalized
localities has the effect o f rendering those localities unhomely for the occupants. If one thinks of
globalization in terms o f an extension o f colonialism - and certainly such a definition is fair,
especially in light of the high levels o f primary commodity exportation in countries such as
Sudan, which puts poorer countries in the position o f sending off all their natural resources for
use by consumers in richer countries as under colonialism - , it makes sense to then consider
globalization’s vagabonds as being postcolonial people. This is a helpful connection to draw
because there is precedent for the discussion of unhomeliness in relationship to the experiences
of postcolonial peoples; for instance, one o f the seminal texts on postcolonial theory, The Empire
Writes Back, includes in the 2002 updated edition the following: “For certainly the
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unheimlichkeit, the ‘unhousedness’ or ‘uncanniness’ which characterizes much colonial
displacement, is a primary force o f disruption in post-colonial life” (218). Bill Ashcroft, Gareth
Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, the authors o f The Empire Writes Back, go on to wonder whether this
sense of unhomeliness or even homelessness can be a source of liberation, which is also an idea
put forth by Homi Bhabha in his advocacy of hybridity or syncretism in postcolonial theory and
life. Bhabha, in his The Location o f Culture, connects the feeling o f unhomeliness, which he calls
“the condition of extra-territorial and cross-cultural initiations,” to the clearly and rigidly drawn
divisions o f Western thought between the “private and public spheres,” resulting in the kind of
“fixity and fetishism o f identities” that postcolonial peoples, especially, cannot afford, given the
impossibility and counter-productivity o f returning to some ‘pure,’ ‘authentic’ pre-colonial
identity or culture (13). For Bhabha, it is the colonial concern with boundaries, including the fear
o f invasion or intrusion and the creation of the private, domestic sphere that (and here he quotes
from Freud’s definition o f the uncanny) “ought to have remained...secret and hidden” that gives
rise to the unhomely. Wolfreys as well makes the point that “the sense o f being ‘not-at-home’ or
‘unhomely’ arises from within the very idea of the home,” thus advancing Bhabha’s claim that
the concept o f unhomeliness depends upon the representations o f homeliness offered by the
“homed” colonizing power (14).
What Bhabha suggests is that instead o f seeing the unhomeliness o f postcolonial life as
dysfunctional or deficient in light o f the images o f homeliness offered by colonial literature, we
recognize the tension o f the unhomely in the idea o f the homely itself. The result is that we may
expose the homely/unhomely binary as resulting from the colonizer’s own struggle to maintain a
fixed and stable sense o f home. Once that recognition is made, Bhabha suggests that postcolonial
peoples should deploy the concept o f unhomeliness as a new basis for a kind o f world literature
that embraces the reality o f syncretism. He writes:
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Where, once, the transmission of national traditions was the major theme of world
literature, perhaps we can now suggest that transnational histories of migrants, the
colonized, or political refugees - these border and frontier conditions - may be the
terrains o f world literature. The centre o f such a study would neither be the
‘sovereignty’ o f national cultures, nor the universalism of human culture, but a
focus on those ‘freak social and cultural displacements’ that
characterize... ‘unhomely’ fictions. (17)
Bhabha’s reframing of unhomeliness as a paradigm to be embraced for the sake of a new
postcolonial reality is certainly worthwhile in light of the fact that most o f the changes wrought
by globalization cannot simply be undone/ and those in the localities must find a way to process
and speak of their experiences. It is even more valuable for the sake of this discussion, however,
in that the notion that the unhomely emerges from with the idea o f the home, that the feeling of
unhomeliness is a consequence of standing deficient before the ideal of the home, describes a
significant facet o f the tourist-vagabond relationship. Bauman argues that the sight o f the
tourists’ enjoyment of their mobility compounds the vagabond’s suffering; the deficiency o f their
circumstances in comparison to new concept o f the home in which the tourists live provokes the
sense of being unhomed.
Tourists and vagabonds can be distinguished from one another by their ability, or lack
thereof, to feel at home in the new space of globalization. The tourists, in control of their
occupation o f space, whether that means moving or standing still, are able to enjoy the feeling of
being “at ease” wherever they happen to be. The “Virtuality o f space” actually achieves for them

^“Undone” might mean, for exam ple, a company, upon being found guilty o f using sweatshop labor, closing down
the factories in question; because these factories have a detrimental effect on other local industries or businesses and
tend to becom e the primary or even sole source o f income for the people in the locality, closing down the sweatshop
is likely to cause serious problems. Thus, although the people would almost certainly have been better o ff had the
corporation never set up production locally, “undoing” that decision by closing down production is not a solution.
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something less like “homedness” and more like the kind o f freedom from the constraints of the
idea o f the home that Bhabha writes about: “it helps to dissolve whatever constraints a real home
may impose - to dematerialize space without exposing [the tourist] to the discomforts and
anxieties of homelessness.” The tourist, then, “has no home - but neither does she feel
homeless”^ (91), which gives the tourists’ life an attraction for vagabonds that make their own
existence that much more painful, and that much more unhomely. The vagabonds’ prison,
Bauman writes, is “all the more humiliating for the obtrusive sight of the others’ freedom to
move” (23). Globalized space is inherently, for vagabonds such as Delial, unhomely. It is this
unhomeliness, more than any other kind or any other conception of the term, that is operating in
Navidson’s house, which essentially offers Navidson the chance to experience globalization from
Delial’s side. It is an unhomeliness that is rooted in the connection and the difference between
the lifestyles o f the tourists and the vagabonds.
VI. The Tourist-Vagabond Relationship
That the tourists make life worse for the vagabonds hints at a deeper relationship between
the two groups than simply setting them in opposition to each other has illustrated. Tourists and
vagabonds exist, according to Bauman, in a relationship o f mutual-dependency that is
characterized in each group’s actual experience by envy (on the part o f the vagabonds toward the
tourists) and rejection and horror (on the part of the tourists towards the vagabonds) (96-7).
According to Bauman, “the vagabond is the tourist’s worst nightmare” because the vagabond
represents what the tourist could become. Since the vagabond is simply a “flawed consumer,”
someone without the means to live like a tourist, a tourist could thus slip into vagabondage at a
m om ent’s notice. The relationship between the tourist and the vagabond is actually, then, much
^It should be remembered that the tourists' lifestyle being characterized by having no home does not mean that they
lack the freedom to create a home, to “Settle in, maybe put down roots,” as Navidson wishes to do (9). In fact,
having that freedom is another point o f difference between tourists and vagabonds, as such an option is available to
(and only to) those who may, like tourists, “stay or m ove at their hearts' desire” (92).
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more complicated than a simple binary. Remember that the vagabond’s “societies are shaped as
profoundly by the global market place as ours,” as McMichael puts it, despite their own inability
to participate in the market as consumers (13). Bauman quotes Jeremy Seabrook on the same
point:
The poor do not inhabit a separate culture from the rich...they must live in the
same world that has been contrived for the benefit o f those with money. And their
poverty is aggravated by economic growth, just as it is intensified by recession
and non-growth. (95)
Because, then, the dividing line between tourists and vagabonds depends upon the tourists
having the resources necessary to enact their desires as consumers and citizens where the
vagabonds do not, especially with regard to the occupation o f space, the line between them is
blurry and permeable, making their circumstances, Bauman writes, “two sides o f the same coin”
(96). The vast body of the human population Bauman thus identifies as half-tourists/halfvagabonds because “there is a large part...of the society o f consumers/travelers, who cannot be
quite sure where do they stand at the moment and even less can be sure that their present
standing will see the light o f the next day” (98, 97):
After all, most jobs are temporary, shares may go down as well as up, skills keep
being devalued and superseded by new and improved skills, the assets one is
proud of and cherishes now become obsolete in no time, exquisite neighborhoods
become shoddy and vulgar, partnerships are formed merely until further notice,’
values worth pursuing and ends worth investing come and go. (97)
As a result, all members o f the global consumer society are tied together by the insecurity (in the
tourist’s position) or the unattainability (in the vagabond’s) o f the ideal consumer/traveler’s
’N avidson and Karen, for instance, lack a binding commitment to one another.
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lifestyle. Significantly, for the tourist, having his life thus intertwined with that o f the vagabond
both results in and grows out of a wholesale and cruel rejection of the vagabond.

world

without vagabonds,"' Bauman writes, “is the utopia o f the society o f the tourists’" (97).
Most of the policies o f law and order put in place to deal with the vagabonds (policies
known also as the criminalization of poverty) - especially those policies that confine them to
certain areas or otherwise police and limit their movements - exist to keep them out of the
tourists’ sight.^ In this sense, then, Navidson clearly does not conform to the tourist’s approach of
avoiding the vagabond, since he seeks out circumstances where he can see them, and even pays a
certain respect to their resilience and strength. This may be, in its way, just another kind of
tourism, in the same vein as, for instance, the Chicago Ghetto Bus Tours: a way to examine “how
the other half lives,” with the intent o f inspiring tourists to help improve the “ghetto”-dwellers’
living conditions, that nonetheless treats real people like animals on safari, a source of
entertainment for the privileged (Child, 1). Nonetheless, N avidson’s attachment to Delial
complicates his role as tourist. He can hardly be said to reject her, holding onto her memory as
he does, keeping her his own closely-guarded secret. And to an extent, this unusual orientation
toward the world’s vagabonds is reflected in Navidson’s approach to his other subjects. His
dedication to his work is framed in terms of an interest in people, “and usually people caught in
terrible circumstances,” that casts him in something o f a romantic - we are told that the “world
around only mattered to him because people lived there and sometimes, in spite of the pain,
tragedy, and degradation, even managed to triumph there” (367) - or even heroic light (422). His
off-center framing of Delial in the photo, leaving an empty space on the right side that Navidson
himself, and any viewer of the photo, seems to occupy, is said to represent his “challenging the

^Jamaica's tourism industry is a particularly striking example o f the way in which a country's people and their real
problems are erased from view for the sake o f the comfort and enjoyment o f tourists. Paul Kingsbury's “Jamaican
Tourism and the Politics o f Enjoyment” addresses this in detail. Geoforum 36 (2005): 113-32
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predator for a helpless prize epitomized by the flightless wings of a dying child’s shoulder
blades” (421), serving thus as a representation of his acute desire to save her and a sense o f real
involvement in her circumstances. And, of course, though he does not save Delial, and though in
the case o f the real and not symbolic girl the idea o f him challenging the vulture for her is absurd
because he makes no attempt to do so until after he has gotten his picture, the photo does inspire
a “large outpouring of public support and the creation of several relief programs” (420). It is fair
then to see Navidson not simply as a tourist, consuming the experience of being in war-torn,
famine-stricken Sudan, but a real humanitarian; the earlier statement in the novel, quoted from
Hector Llosa, is relevant to Navidson’s circumstances: “Photojoumalists especially should not
underestimate the power and influence o f their images. You may be thinking. I’ve done nothing
in this moment except take a photo (true) but realize you have also done an enormous amount for
society at large (also true!)” (394). Leaving aside, however, that international aid has been
insufficient to solve Sudan’s problems or prevent the equally terrible deaths o f many other
Déliais, and may actually be creating several problems of its own,^ Navidson’s concern is not
with the world, but the people in it. Thus, none o f the social consequences incited by his photo
can erase for him the fact that an actual little girl died in his arms, and that all he was able to do
for her was to take her photo, and that he took it before he had tried to do anything else.
Navidson’s insistence on seeing Delial as specific and real and human is a genuine point of
departure from the tourist model, and an important one.
Navidson more clearly falls into the tourist trap, however, in his dependence upon the
subjects of his work, as dependence, even more than rejection, characterizes the tourist’s
relationship to the vagabond. Without ever explicitly connecting his ideas to the notion of
^Consider, for instance, John Vidal's recent article in the Guardian detailing how development in southern Sudan has
been “hindered” by the World Bank, due to the delay in providing promised aid, a lack o f awareness o f the country's
priorities, and the importation o f labor and resources, leading to unemployment and a higher cost o f living:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/18/southem-sudan-development-world-bank.
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othering as a form of self-definition, Bauman notes that the sight of the vagabond as the horrible
alternative to their own way of life helps the tourist to enjoy his or her existence. In fact, he
writes that the tourist has a vested interest in making the vagabond’s life as miserable as possible
in comparison to the tourist’s own, because the “worse is the plight o f the vagabonds, the better it
feels to be a tourist” (98). And it is with regard to this indirect enjoyment o f the vagabond’s
suffering that Navidson is most guilty o f the sins o f the tourist. In addition to the framing of
Navidson’s work as reflecting an investment in people, the book also insists on another framing,
which is o f Navidson being driven to try to capture an image o f death, which he always
approaches with someone else standing between it and him (422) - an “other” that presumably
protects him from death by being in its way. To be as uncharitable to Navidson as he is to
himself, the interposing of this other between him and real danger is akin to the tourist
maintaining (or even worsening) the vagabond’s position in order that their own position seems
more stable and less dangerous. Bauman writes that “Were there no vagabonds, the tourists
would feel the need to invent them” (98). Navidson’s career, similarly, depends upon the
existence o f some person in “terrible circumstances,” circumstances from which he is separate,
and that other person is always interposed between him and the horror he is photographing. No
matter his interest, no matter his compassion, Navidson’s life as a tourist is rooted in consuming,
through photography, the specter o f those suffering in ways he, as a tourist, will not. It is this sin,
the novel suggests, that Navidson is looking to rectify by entering the house, as the house would
serve as “a place that would threaten no one else’s existence but his own” (422).
Navidson’s experiences upon his return to the house, then, are important largely because
they serve as his penance for his very specific crime: that his entire lifestyle and career have been
dependent upon the suffering o f others, with Delial being simply the most striking and tragic
example. Navidson goes into the house to exorcise Delial, both as the ghost that is haunting him
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and as the avatar of his dependence, as a tourist, on the suffering of the vagabonds. The
implication of this, that Navidson is somehow trying to transform him self from a tourist to a
position where there is less potential (or even demand) to exploit others, raises an interesting
question: within the walls of his house, is Navidson a tourist or a vagabond? To an extent he
approaches the problem of the house as a tourist, especially in the earlier explorations: he insists
that the space should be transparent to him, that he should have ownership o f it, and that he
should be able to occupy it and move within it according to his own will. Even his return, which
he makes in part because “going after something like this is who [he is]” (389), is as much an
outgrowth of his old way of being in the world as it is also, paradoxically, an attempt to humble
himself before the house and relocate himself in relationship to the people in the world living in
“terrible circumstances.” Fittingly, then, especially because in the real world one hardly chooses
to be a tourist, vagabond, or something in between, the bigger part o f the question of Navidson’s
status is not about how he chooses to behave but how the house forces him to behave. In the face
of his conflicting will, then, does the house render Navidson a vagabond or allow him to remain
a tourist?
It would be hard to argue that Navidson has any of the luxuries of the tourist within the
house. The ceiling descends or rises, walls disappear and reappear, and Navidson seems to be
headed downhill no matter which direction he faces, until he feels he is on “an infinitely large
billiard table” and finds that “direction no longer matters” (426-33). Not only is the space not
stable or transparent for Navidson, but he can’t even control his place within it while on his bike,
since the decline of the passageway sends him rolling at high speeds. In no way, then, can
Navidson be a tourist in that space. At one point, the text reads, “Having little choice, Navidson
continues on” (434). This echoes quite strikingly Bauman’s statement about the vagabond being
forced to move because every place they might have stood still is inhospitable; Navidson cannot
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settle down within the house, so he must move, even though there is nowhere to go. He must
eontinue though he is injured after erashing his bike, though he is exhausted, though his
resourees begin to dwindle. He reaches a point eventually where he is floating or falling, with
nothing to do but wait (472).
That Navidson’s condition within the house eomes to resemble the conditions o f a
vagabond mean means less, however, than how Navidson him self changes, especially since this
reading is predicated on the notion that the house and what it reveals to Navidson are intimately
connected to his psychological issues. It should probably be noted that a simpler argument
connecting the tourist/vagabond class model to the house but ignoring Delial and Navidson’s
personal journey is possible. Putting priority on the anxiety o f the tourist because o f the tenuous
line between the tourist and the vagabond, this reading would suggest that the
disruption/intrusion of the house is representative o f the changes a tourist experiences when he or
she begins to slip, for reasons ever beyond their control, into vagabondage. This would account
for all the same characteristics o f the house’s behavior as well as the way that anxiety extends
beyond the house to Johrmy and to the reader; the transition into vagabondage is one that makes
people no longer who they were or thought they were, makes them unsure o f their place in the
world, steals the security and immutability of their space, renders old ideas and values obsolete.
In that way the novel. The Navidson Record, and Delial would serve, as the Delials/vagabonds of
the world always have, as the warning to we tourists o f the unstable ground on which every
“assurance [we] ever lived by” has been built (xxiii). This reading, however, sells Navidson short
as a character, and does not account for the fact that, ultimately, he escapes. That he does, and
how he does, is what makes an alternative reading much more viable. The anxiety we feel as the
tourist is something we experience every day, and it does not alter our worldview or way o f life;
thus, it makes more sense to consider Navidson’s guilt as central and not peripheral to the
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disruption he experiences. The upheaval of his life is rooted not in the knowledge that such
upheaval is always possible, even for those like him who have been immune for so long and have
experienced the best of the tourist lifestyle; instead, it is rooted in his realization o f his
dependence on the suffering of the world’s Déliais. Guilt and not simple insecurity is what
intrudes on Navidson’s life, his guilt is what he faces in the house (and therefore what shapes the
house after the kind of terrible circumstances others have been forced into to allow Navidson his
career and lifestyle), and the resolution he comes to within the house about that guilt and about
himself is what allows him to escape.
VII. Escape
Navidson’s serious self-assessment begins after he starts floating/falling: “Soon...he
grows less concerned about where he is and more consumed by who he once was” (473). He
“begins rambling on about people he has known and loved: Tom...Delial, his children, and more
and more frequently Karen” (474). Navidson, as he anticipates death, becomes focused on what
is important to him: people, as has ever been the case with him, made specific and real by his
regard for them. This awareness o f his connections with other people is reflected in other o f his
final moments in the house. When he momentarily “los[es] sight of the question o f his own past,
derailed by some tune now wedged in his head,” the lyrics that spring to his mind are “Now I
find I changed my mind, and opened up the door” (476) which is a line from The Beatles’
“Help” :
When I was younger, so much younger than today,
I never needed anybody’s help in any way.
But now these days are gone. I’m not so self assured,
Now I find I’ve changed my mind and opened up the door. (AskLyrics.com)
The line, thus, reflects Navidson’s focus on intimate, caring relationships. And “caring” may be
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the operative word; Navidson’s final word before The Navidson Record ends is “Care” (488).
The novel’s definitive statement on the subject seems to be Sophia Blynn’s argument that “Care”
was in fact the beginning of “Karen,” and that Navidson found his salvation in the love o f his
partner (523). Certainly that is a possibility, and one that hardly contradicts the idea that
Navidson’s lesson is to care; it is only after his reunion with Karen that the house dissolves, after
all, and it is her love for him that gives her the certainty that she will find him. But although he
and Karen finally marry in the aftermath o f the events in the house, and although they and the
children and their pets make what seems more or less to be a safe, comfortable, and stable life
together, the novel does not seem to be offering a retreat into the comforts o f home, comforts
available only to the tourists, as any kind o f answer to the questions/problems posed by the
house. The Navidsons “will never be able to leave the memory of that place,” and Navidson
him self “has never stopped wrestling with the meaning o f his experience,” which the book
connects one final time to “the responsibilities o f his art” (526-7). Moreover, the chapter is
entitled “Passion” (540), and it is not with regard to Navidson’s marriage or family that the word
is used and defined for us, but with regard to his work. “It is not about feeling good,” Daphne
Kaplan tells us of passion; “It is about endurance” (527). Navidson resigns him self to suffering
for his art, suffering from the caring it entails, and continues to do it. His lesson is not that he has
no responsibility for Delial, then, but that his suffering for it was necessary, and good, an
outgrowth of the same passion, the same caring, that saved his life.
If the Navidson-Delial parallel is meant to convey to the audience their own culpability
for the suffering and death o f the world’s Déliais, if the text makes us journey with Navidson
toward the realization that Navidson eventually reaches, then there remains a need to
demonstrate how Navidson’s lesson radiates through the rest of the novel and the experience o f
the readers, as well as how it relates to the real-life relationship between tourists and vagabonds.
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Here I must emphasize, more pointedly than before, the specificity o f Delial in Navidson’s mind,
her existence for him as an actual person, whom he associates in his letter with his daughter, and
not the symbol which was used to inspire the action that may or may not have alleviated the
suffering of her fellows in Sudan. Continuing to see her and all the subjects of his photography
as real in such a way represents a determination to see other people as subjects and not as
objects. The importance, then, o f subject-subject (I-Thou) relationships over subject-object (I-It)
relationships as they concern tourists and vagabonds cannot be overstated with regard to
Navidson’s solution.
The difference between the I-Thou and the I-It, how that difference is made manifest in
the actual treatment of other people, and, in general, the destructive and self-destructive power of
a world over-reliant on the I-It relationship, is important to critical theory, most specifically in
the work of Erich Fromm, but also in Marx’s humanism, on which critical theory is grounded;
Herbert Marcuse writes for instance of M arx’s notion of human appropriation of the object
world, or “the establishment o f human relationships with nature, the humanization of things,”
that such appropriation allows that “the object would be experienced as subject to the degree to
which the subject, man, makes the object world into a humane world.” This experience of objects
as subjects may also be explained as “the experience that things, without losing their use value,
exist in their own right, their own form, that they are sensitive” (132). Fromm’s discussion of
subjectivity bears striking similarities to points made by Derrick Jensen in his The Culture o f
Make Believe - a book that attempts to explore the individual’s culpability for international
tragedies like Delial’s through a discussion of hate as something we do rather than something we
feel. The ability to care, as Navidson does, is for Jensen and Fromm dependent on overcoming
any tendency to view another person as an object, from outside o f them. Fromm introduces the
idea o f the I-Thou relationship, and states that “this relatedness...is not from the T ’ to the ‘thou’
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but one whieh is eharacterized by the phrase: I am thou” (79). In diseussing the value o f this
experienee, he quotes Goethe, who says that “eaeh object truly recognized opens up a new organ
within ourselves” (79).
This is a point that Jensen advances in his own discussion o f the 1-Thou relationship,
contrasting the I-Thou or I-You with the 1-lt, the objectification that is essential to his thesis,
since, he writes, “The movement toward depriving others o f their subjectivity is the central
movement of our culture” (38). Jensen states, quoting Martin Buber’s I and Thou, that “ T-You
can only be spoken with one’s whole being,’ while the opposite is true o f 1-lt, whieh can never be
spoken with one’s whole being...[T]o objectify another is to only partially exist oneself’ (221).
Applied to Navidson’s circumstances, Buber’s theory would seem to imply that “meeting” Delial
does not provoke but merely reveals a crisis of identity that existed as a result o f his position as a
tourist. This conclusion is consistent with the language used to describe the crisis, which implies
the falseness o f the identity to which he held before Delial and to whieh we readers (according to
Johnny) held before reading the novel. Furthermore, Fromm implies that having an identity at all
is dependent on having the subjeet-subjeet relationships that allow us to be whole and to be
subjects in our own right. Identity allows for the experienee o f oneself as “1,” a subject who is,
“‘T as an organizing active center of the structure o f all my actual or potential activities,” as
opposed to a “me,” an object that one has (82-3); this sets up the contrast between being and
having that is so vital to Fromm’s work, whieh can be understood as the contrast between a
person who experiences him or herself and others as subjects and one who experiences the same
as objects. Tourists, consumers and sensation seekers that we are, are taught to have and not to
be; Navidson, in his decision to care, to insist upon Delial’s personhood after taking her picture
and continue to worry about the moral implications and human consequences o f his actions even
after his preoccupation with Delial has allowed her to haunt him in the form o f his house, rejects
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that lifestyle, and is saved by doing so.
Much different from the treatise on nihilism that Will Slocombe proposes, then. House o f
Leaves is a novel about negotiating the tension surrounding the culpability of tourists for the
material, spatial, and psychological conditions of the vagabonds. So long as our lives as tourists
depend upon not just the fact but the sight of the vagabonds’ suffering, then our ability to
objectify, to not see (which Jensen argues is the primary mechanism that allows our system of
exploitation to continue'*^), is always interrupted, and the vagabonds’ reality and their
subjectivity can thus shine through, provoking empathy and, when possible, and ideally with that
empathy as its grounding motive, positive action. Then, although we have to be aware of and live
within the complications of our attempts to help and the ways in which they might, like
Navidson’s “consuming” his subjects, be part and parcel of that same system o f exploitation, our
answer is to continue to care, to continue to try, to wrestle continuously with the uncertainty of
our role and forever be assessing and reassessing the value of our contributions, and to endure.
The novel can thus be appreciated as an exploration of our social responsibility within a system
that creates Déliais as a matter of course and that seems, dishearteningly, to have no “outside.”
The conclusions to that exploration that the novel offers, while they provide no place for us to
settle down comfortably, do remind us o f several significant truths about our relationship to the
world’s vagabonds. The first is that they matter, that they have subjectivity and live real lives and
are neither an abstraction nor an undifferentiated mob. The second is that, despite the
exploitative relationship between us and them, we are capable o f both being aware o f and
changing the way we see them, and of acting to alter either their immediate circumstances or the
system in which we are all involved. “Meeting” Delial as the little girl she was instead of the
'°“T h e b est w a y to guarantee y o u w on't be in a relationship with so m eth in g is to not se e it. T h e best w a y to m ake certain you
w on 't se e so m e th in g is to d estroy it. A nd, com p letin g this aw fu l circle, it is ea siest to d estroy som eth in g y o u refu se to see. T h is, in
a n u tsh ell, is the k ey to our civ iliza tio n 's ability to w ork its w ill on the w orld and on other cultures: Our p o w er (in d ivid u ally and
so c ia lly ) d eriv es from our steadfast refusal to enter into m ean in gfu l and m utual relation sh ip s” (303).
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image she became may leave us disoriented, may cause us to lose our old understanding of
ourselves and the world, but caring and acting can help us to relocate ourselves in the world
again.
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Appendix

The real Delial, via Flatrock.org.nz. Photograph by Kevin Carter.
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